I. OVERVIEW

The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signed under African Union (AU) auspices on 5 May 2006 between Sudan’s government and the faction of the insurgent Sudan Liberation Army led by Minni Arkou Minawi (SLA/MM) is a first step toward ending the violence but strong, coordinated action is needed if it is to take hold. The document has serious flaws, and two of the three rebel delegations did not accept it. Fighting between rebel and government forces is down somewhat but violence is worse in some areas due to clashes between SLA factions, banditry, and inter-tribal feuds, while the Chad border remains volatile. If the DPA is not to leave Darfur more fragmented and conflict-prone than before, the international community must rapidly take practical measures to shore up its security provisions, improve prospects for the displaced to return home, bring in the holdouts and rapidly deploy a robust UN peacekeeping force with Chapter VII authority.

Two parties to the negotiations in Abuja – the SLA faction of Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nur (SLA/AW) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – have refused to sign. Abdel Wahid demands more direct SLA participation in implementation of security arrangements and is also dissatisfied with the DPA’s provisions for political representation and a victim’s compensation fund. JEM maintains that the protocols on power and wealth sharing do not adequately address the conflict’s root causes: the structural inequities between Sudan’s centre and its periphery that led to the rebellion in 2003. Indeed, the DPA has accelerated the break-up of the insurgency into smaller blocs along loose ethnic lines.

Broadening buy-in and implementation of the security protocols will either make or break the peace in the short term. Maximum use needs to be made of the opportunity provided by the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, a communal reconciliation process prescribed by the DPA, to get acceptance of the agreement from segments of the population that were not represented in Abuja. Women’s full participation will be important.

Security will not improve, however, unless Khartoum disarms its proxy Janjaweed forces, a commitment it has already broken on five occasions. Unfortunately, the DPA offers no guarantees on implementation. The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is already overstretched and lacks the capacity to perform the additional monitoring and verification duties now asked of it. The DPA also does not address the takeover of peacekeeping operations by the UN, which is daily becoming more necessary. Khartoum continues to obstruct and delay the planning process for that UN mission. If AMIS and then UN peacekeepers must ask the government’s permission at every step, they will not be able to create the confidence refugees and displaced persons (IDPs) need to go home.

Current scenarios envisage a further six to nine months before the UN force is deployed. Many policymakers recognise that is unacceptably slow, because it means more deaths and no refugee and IDP returns, but have been reluctant to suggest more effective alternatives. The following steps are urgently required:

- The Security Council should apply sanctions that target any side, including the government, that violates the ceasefire or attacks civilians, peacekeepers, or humanitarian operations.
- The AU should spare no effort to widen acceptance of the DPA by all stakeholders, including by maintaining the dialogue with the SLA/Abdel Wahid faction and seeking further compromises on power and wealth-sharing issues, and its international partners, including the U.S. and the European Union (EU), should provide the political and financial backing that is needed for a successful Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation.
- The UN and other international partners should assist the AU in immediately strengthening AMIS by providing resources, logistical support and technical expertise, and troop contributing countries in Africa should bring the force up to its authorised ceiling, so it can better carry out its current mandate as well as the additional tasks in the DPA.
- The Security Council should authorise deployment of a robust UN force, starting with a rapid reaction component, to take over from AMIS by 1 October 2006, with a clear Chapter VII mandate to use all necessary means to protect civilians and assist in the implementation of the DPA, including to act militarily as necessary to contain or neutralise Janjaweed, rebel and hard-line government spoilers.
The EU and NATO should work with the UN and the AU to ensure that the peacekeeping force has the capability to react rapidly to ceasefire violations or provocations by any party, and countries with advanced military capabilities should detail senior officers to the headquarters of the peacekeeping force to bolster its professionalism.

II. TOWARD A DEAL

The DPA consists of three protocols, on power sharing, wealth sharing and security arrangements, as well as a chapter laying out the framework for a “Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation”. The agreement followed more than two years of difficult negotiations, the seventh and final round of which was marked by serious deterioration of the security situation on the ground, including increasing attacks by all parties on civilians, humanitarian workers and AU peacekeepers. The DPA’s weaknesses reflect the complexities of the negotiating process. The parties were unevenly matched in diplomatic experience: the rebels lacked a common position, and key members of their delegations were often absent.1

The government delegation was dominated by the ruling National Congress Party (NCP).2 The three rebel delegations included the Sudan Liberation Army faction led by the movement’s original chairman Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nur (SLA/AW); the faction headed by his rival, Minni Minawi (SLA/MM); and the Islamist Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), led by Khalil Ibrahim.3

Increasing divisions and shifting alliances have been the norm for the rebels,4 who made little progress at the table against the government’s skilled team.

The seventh round began on 29 November 2005, and went nowhere for two months. In February, AU mediators sought to end the stalemate by blessing separate bilateral power-sharing talks between the government and Abdel Wahid’s factions. Those secret talks led to a text, which it was hoped the other two delegations would accept to avoid being marginalised.5 The NCP, past masters of divide and conquer techniques, believed such a deal would weaken the insurgency’s collective leverage, but, according to sources close to the mediation, Abdel Wahid bolted at the last moment.6

On 14 February Abdel Wahid announced the end of the effort to coordinate a negotiating position with the SLA/MM faction and JEM. This put him at odds with his own senior lieutenants, and by the next month, he was struggling to keep his position as chairman.7 That are drawn mainly from the Zaghawa people, is militarily stronger and internally more cohesive. In late October 2005, Minni organised a conference at Haskanita, in which he was “elected” the new SLA chairman. Abdel Wahid refused to attend and contested the outcome of the election, as do many others, including some participants. SLA/MM has made a greater commitment than JEM or SLA/AW to the development of a political movement with functioning party structures. JEM is much smaller than the two SLA factions. Most of its military arm broke away in March 2004 to form the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD). A second breakaway JEM faction emerged in April 2005, led by Mohamed Saleh Harba. The AU mediation did not recognise the new factions, and they were not part of the negotiations. For background on Darfur’s rebel groups, see Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°32, Unifying Darfur’s Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace, 6 October 2005.

4 For a recent update on shifting rebel allegiances, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°105, To Save Darfur, 17 March 2006.
6 Abdel Wahid is alleged to have discussed the deal directly with Salah Abduallah Gosh, the head of the government intelligence agency, in February 2006. Crisis Group interview, Abuja, 14 April 2006; Crisis Group correspondence, 7 June 2006.
7 The three Darfur insurgent delegations came under tremendous international pressure to agree on a joint approach, an effort led by the AU mediation, with the backing of Eritrea, Chad, Libya, the U.S. and a host of Darfur and international civil society organisations. Abdel Wahid gave as reasons for his decision: continued attacks on his forces, both on the ground and in negative propaganda; and the initiative taken by the SLA/MM and JEM to attend a high-level meeting in Tripoli on 6 January 2006 without consultation with his faction and then to form the Revolutionary Alliance of Western Sudan on 18 January 2006. Even an ephemeral and ill-advised initiative by the Slovenian presidency of the European Union (EU) to resolve the Darfur conflict played a role in undermining the shaky rebel unity. See

---

1 Women were largely excluded from the negotiations until the seventh round when the African Union and international partners pressed for their increased involvement and supported a Gender Experts Support Team (GEST). In the three-week span of that final round, the team secured gender-sensitive language in many of the DPA’s provisions. However, the agreement contains no implementation guarantees for those provisions. There are no quotas for women’s participation in decision-making bodies or security structures, for example, and no mechanisms to monitor gender-based violence. The inclusion of women in the process, in other words, was too little, too late, and the attention to gender in the agreement, although pervasive, is superficial. Crisis Group will examine the potential for women to contribute more extensively to peacemaking and peacebuilding in African conflicts, including those in Sudan, in a subsequent report.

2 The Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) – the former southern insurgency, now the NCP’s minority partner in the government of national unity (GNU) – was conspicuous mainly by its absence in the early rounds. It engaged more substantively during the final round but with little impact on government positions.

3 SLA/AW has frequently been rocked by internal dissent and defections but continues to command a following primarily among Abdel Wahid’s Fur tribe. The SLA/MM, whose fighters...
meant Khartoum and the AU mediators would have to find another candidate for a separate deal.

A meeting in Brussels on 8 March achieved a breakthrough between the AU, Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Taha and key international partners of the AU, including the European Union (EU), U.S. and UN. Taha committed Khartoum to consider the handover of the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur to the UN if a peace agreement was reached in Abuja and indicated the UN could begin to plan for such a mission. In the following days, the government sent strong signals that it might be willing to make concessions, key rebel leaders returned to Abuja and, on 10 March, the AU Peace and Security Council authorised an intensive push for a settlement.

Although Abdel Wahid was preoccupied with dissent inside his faction, Minni Minawi’s reengagement helped propel the process forward. During his extended absences from Abuja in early 2006, his delegates had stuck rigidly to their positions. Minni was prepared to be more flexible on power sharing than others of his inner circle, and as the leader of the strongest rebel military force, he was the only figure capable of delivering a genuine deal on security. A diplomat at the talks told Crisis Group: “The JEM’s military capabilities are minimal; Abdel Wahid has defensive capabilities but Minni is the only one with an offensive capability. Security is his issue”. The key, another close observer said, was to “establish an environment where [Minni] felt as though he can make a deal”.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE DPA

The shift of focus from Abdel Wahid, who is generally acknowledged to have the largest constituency in Darfur, primarily among members of his Fur tribe, to Minni as the key to a settlement also meant a shift in focus of the mediation effort from power sharing to security. The result is that the DPA’s security arrangements are far more substantive and favourable to the rebels than the power and wealth-sharing arrangements – the two areas which Abdel Wahid insisted, and continues to insist, had to be improved before he would sign a deal.

On 25 April, the AU mediation team presented the parties with a compromise document and gave them five days to accept or reject it. By 30 April, the government had said it would sign despite several reservations but the rebel delegations were not ready. Senior diplomats quickly mobilised: U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, UK Development Secretary Hillary Benn, and AU Commissioner Alpha Oumar Konare went to Abuja. The mediators twice extended the deadline by 48 hours, while their partners applied pressure on the insurgent leaders – especially Minni – to sign.

Amendments proposed by the mediators concentrated mainly on security provisions, such as greater detail on the disarmament of the Janjaweed and the integration of the insurgent forces into the army. The senior diplomats and AU officials, including the current chair, President Sasso Nguesso of the Congo (Brazzaville), and Nigeria’s president, Olusegun Obasanjo, extracted additional concessions from the government and then placed heavy pressure on Minni in the hope that if he signed, Abdel Wahid and JEM would as well.

On 5 May, Minni Minawi did sign but Abdel Wahid and JEM refused, though several members of the SLA/AW delegation broke with their leader and declared their support for the agreement. The AU Peace and Security Council on 15 May gave the SLA/AW and JEM until 31 May to join the agreement. That deadline has slipped and, as discussed below, efforts to convince both to come aboard continue.

“Important statement from the SLA negotiating team on the circumstances surrounding the decision by Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nur to cease the coordination and common vision”, dated 17 February 2006, posted on Sudaneseonline.com on 18 February 2006 (in Arabic).

8 Crisis Group interview, Heddi Annabi, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, May 2006.

9 Crisis Group interview, Abuja, 7 April 2006.

10 Crisis Group interviews, Abuja, April 2006. Looking at a protracted stalemate, the AU mediation team and the international partners pressured Minni to engage and achieved a breakthrough in early March. Security arrangements could not proceed until the parties mapped their forces on the ground to give the mediation team and its partners a clearer idea of their relative strength. Minni was understandably concerned about revealing sensitive details, and the mediation team and international partners found a secure location at which to begin the mapping. The force-mapping exercise strengthened the hand of the insurgents, especially Minni’s faction, as it revealed the extent of his control and forced the government to concede that the rebels controlled some areas.

11 Following Abdel Wahid’s refusal to sign the DPA, a group of his followers led by Abdel Rahman Musa, the faction’s lead negotiator, dissented and joined the signing ceremony at the last moment. Crisis Group telephone interviews, Abdel Rahman Musa, May 2006. See also Section IV A below.
A. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The DPA’s greatest failing is its lack of modalities and implementation guarantees for disarmament of the Janjaweed militias and the voluntary and safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their villages. Its comprehensive ceasefire and security arrangements require the parties to disarm themselves, a task usually left for peacekeepers, while authorising AMIS to verify and monitor the processes of their redeployment, assembly and disarmament. This requires robust monitoring but AMIS has too few troops, with too little mobility and firepower and inadequate intelligence capabilities, to do it properly.12 Members of the AU mediation team and AMIS officials in Abuja admitted openly that AMIS as currently constituted cannot fulfil these tasks.13 Yet, the DPA contains no reference to a UN takeover of peacekeeping responsibilities, observers in Abuja told Crisis Group, because such a reference was a “non-starter” for Khartoum.14 A member of the mediation team claimed that “if the AU hands over to the UN, then references to the AU are automatically replaced with UN”.15

In essence, there is a very real danger that the international community, in its eagerness to get a deal, has brokered one that is structurally weak. Without the good faith of the parties, particularly of the government, and without effective fulfilment by AMIS of its verification and patrolling roles, the DPA is destined to fail.

1. Disarmament and definition of the Janjaweed

The government negotiators in the security commission, led by Lieutenant General Ismat Abdelrahman, gave virtually no ground throughout the talks, insisting that the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed on 8 April 2004 in N’Djamena was adequate and should retain primacy over additional ceasefire agreements. The N’Djamena agreement, which has been consistently violated by all parties, requires the government to “neutralise the armed militias”, but a handwritten provision added after the official signing calls for the disarmament of the militias to be carried out in parallel to the cantonment of the rebels. Except for the government, this provision has been rejected by all parties, including the AU.16

Linking the Janjaweed and rebel forces is critical for Khartoum’s attempt to portray the Darfur conflict as an internal and tribal struggle rather than a civil war between insurgents and the central government. A government delegate in Abuja claimed to Crisis Group that, “Darfur is the first conflict since independence that is not political, but tribal. Even in the South, conflict had political roots”.17 Under threat of additional UN Security Council sanctions and the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation into atrocity crimes in Darfur, the regime will insist on this fiction to give it plausible deniability for atrocities committed by ethnic militias under its control and often accompanied by regular government forces. Delegates at Abuja admitted to government recruitment of Arab tribes into the army and the paramilitary Popular Defence Forces (PDF) to fight the rebels but disassociated Khartoum from the Janjaweed. General Abdelrahman told Crisis Group: “We have no control over them, really, so how can we disarm them”?18

The Janjaweed and other government-supported militias remain the most pressing threat to security in Darfur, and civilians will not begin to feel safe until they are dealt with. The government has agreed in writing to identify, neutralise and disarm its proxy militias on five previous occasions and has been ordered to disarm them in multiple UN Security Council resolutions since July 2004. However, it continues to arm and recruit militias and support their operations even in the weeks since signing the DPA.19 Likewise, the government’s support for the attempted coup in Chad on 13 April 2006 and its continued backing of Chadian rebels (discussed below) are clear indications that it still regards a military solution to the conflict as a viable option. “Why should we be impressed that the NCP has just committed to disarm the Janjaweed for the sixth time?”, an observer asked Crisis Group. “Is there a new reason to believe they’ll implement it this time”?20

---

17 Crisis Group interview, Sudanese government delegate, Abuja, 10 April, 2006
18 Crisis Group interview, Abuja, 16 April 2006
19 Sudan’s government has agreed to neutralise or disarm the militias it has armed and controls or influences in five separate agreements: The N’Djamena ceasefire agreement of 8 April 2004, the N’Djamena agreement of 25 April 2004, the 3 July 2004 communiqué signed with the UN, the 5 August 2004 Plan of Action signed with the UN, and the 9 November 2004 Protocol on Security Arrangements signed at the AU-led Abuja talks. The government has also agreed to identify those militias under its control or influence in the 5 August Plan of Action and the 9 November Protocol. It reiterated its promise to disarm the militias in the 19 December 2004 ceasefire signed with the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD).
As leader of the sole movement capable of continuing the military struggle if the ceasefire should fail, Minni was especially insistent that the government take concrete, verifiable action on the Janjaweed before he begins to implement his arms control commitments.21 As a result, the DPA’s security arrangements require the complete and verifiable disarmament of the Janjaweed and other government militias by October 2006 – before the insurgents begin to assemble and disarm their fighters. If the government does not disarm its militias, the rebels are under no obligation to assemble and disarm.

However, “Janjaweed” remains poorly defined. The government has already hidden considerable numbers by admitting them into the formal security services, like the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), the Border Intelligence Units and the Central Reserve Police (the riot police). One observer estimates that nearly half the Janjaweed have already been disguised this way.22 Although the DPA requires downsizing of these forces, with the exception of the riot police, to their pre-conflict level, it leaves responsibility solely to the government, with no provisions for monitoring compliance.23

Concerns about the potential for the Janjaweed to act as spoilers were validated almost immediately. On 8 May, Janjaweed militia reportedly attacked villages near Buram, in South Darfur. On 15 May, Janjaweed killed eleven civilians in attacks against villages around Kutum, North Darfur. The following day, they burned villages around Donkey Dereisa, south of Nyala in South Darfur. On 17 May, Janjaweed fired at an AU patrol.24 The UN and the AU said on 21 May that at least 60 people were killed the previous week in attacks for which the Janjaweed were primarily responsible.25 The SLA/MM faction accused the government of breaching the peace agreement, claiming that Janjaweed and government forces jointly attacked its positions at Dar es-Salaam in North Darfur on 21 May.26

2. Protection of civilians

The DPA contains detailed provisions for protection of IDPs inside camps but offers few guarantees for refugees and IDPs as they return to their villages. The ultimate goal of any settlement must be the safe and voluntary return home of such persons to resume their livelihoods. To go home, civilians displaced by the Darfur conflict must trek from squalid camps and makeshift settlements to destroyed villages and farms. Some have maintained infrequent contact with their villages but numerous armed groups continue to prey on those who leave the relative security of larger camps, and the longer people are displaced, the less likely they are to return home.27

Since not all armed actors have signed the DPA, the parties to it, AMIS and eventually UN peacekeepers must work closely together to improve the protection of all civilians, including, in addition to the returnees, people living in remote areas. Equally importantly, the parties must address the land and property disputes that will inevitably arise upon return by strictly implementing the DPA mechanisms. Many IDPs will be discouraged by the fact that the government retains responsibility for policing in areas under its control; ensuring a degree of international participation in and oversight of policing functions will be critical to building confidence in the agreement among refugees and IDPs. It is likewise important that women, who comprise the majority of IDPs, are consulted on all issues related to their return and resettlement and are fully included in the decision-making mechanisms.

3. Military integration, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

A second key demand of the rebels, particularly Minni’s faction, was that part of their forces be integrated into the Sudanese army, with the remainder to take part in disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programs. Last minute amendments were introduced into the DPA’s security protocol to meet this requirement. While retaining both its Ceasefire Commission and its Joint Commission, the protocol improved upon the ceasefire agreement signed in N’Djamena in April 2004.28 The first of its two sections contains enhanced, comprehensive ceasefire and transitional security arrangements, requiring the parties to disengage their forces, redeploys them to areas they control and begin a disarmament process in stages.

26 "Darfur rebels say Sudan breaches cease-fire", Reuters, 21 May 2006.
28 The “Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire on the Conflict in Darfur of the 8th Day of April 2004”, the original N’Djamena agreement, established a Ceasefire Commission (CFC), which reports to a Joint Commission (JC) and is authorised to facilitate implementation by coordinating between the warring parties, investigating alleged violations and, within its capacity, preventing future aggression. The CFC decides on ceasefire violations by consensus if it can and refers disagreements to the JC. The JC is meant to support the CFC by engaging the parties at a higher political level and holding persistent violators to account.
The second deals with long-term issues, including security sector reform and integration of former rebel fighters into government security structures.

These improvements, as noted, are offset by the fact that the DPA requires the parties to disarm themselves, a task usually assigned to the peacekeeping mission. Further, the DPA designates AMIS to monitor and verify compliance and to be responsible for several related tasks, including inspection and certification of assembly areas for rebel fighters; establishment and enforcement of buffer zones from which the parties are excluded around IDP camps and main humanitarian corridors; and separation of the parties’ areas of control. The AU mission is already stretched to the limit and has repeatedly appealed to its international partners to enhance its capabilities. Unless it receives adequate support, an essential element for the DPA’s success will be missing, pending the transition to a UN force.

The failure of AMIS, the only neutral force on the ground, to meet deadlines would cause the implementation schedule to slip, and each target missed would give a further argument to those working to undermine the DPA. The international community needs to give AMIS help quickly but it also must be realistic. Capacity building for AMIS has limits and, while essential, is no substitute for rapidly deploying a strong UN peacekeeping force with a clear mandate.

4. The Darfur-Chad border

Control of the Chad border was another sticking point in the negotiations. Insecurity has escalated there in recent months due to the proxy war between the governments of Chad and Sudan. Numerous armed Chadian opposition groups supported directly by Khartoum are operating in Darfur, and members of Chad’s ruling circles are giving logistical support and material to the SLA and JEM.30 The rebels who attacked N’Djamena on 11 April 2006 originated in Darfur, some crossing into Chad via the Central African Republic to avoid detection.

The Sudanese government’s position, supported by the AU mediation team and the international partners, is that it retains the sovereign right to control the country’s borders. However, Minni is wary of what government deployment along the border could mean, especially if there were to be a change of regime in Chad. A friend of Khartoum in N’Djamena might allow Sudanese government-backed militias to attack the Darfur rebels from the rear, while Sudanese troops along the border offered logistical support and took part in joint operations. The SLA/AW has urged joint SLA/Sudan government patrols along the border. Sources close to the talks believe Khartoum is not actually planning a border deployment and Minni’s fears are unfounded, but recent developments in Chad are a grave concern for the rebels, and border security remains a delicate issue.31

The DPA integrates elements of the 8 February 2006 Tripoli Agreement which obligate Sudan’s government to ban Chadian armed groups from its territory and requires the parties to work together to disarm and expel such groups.32 The DPA grants AMIS the authority to investigate violations by Chadian groups and report them to the Tripoli Agreement mechanisms. The introduction of these provisions helped at least in part to address SLA/MM concerns about its vulnerability in the border area. However, the mechanisms proved totally ineffective in deterring Chadian rebels based in West Darfur from attacking N’Djamena in April.

5. Other security issues

Other challenges to the DPA are likely to arise from the insurgents who rejected it, notably the Abdel Wahid faction of the SLA and JEM, as well as the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD), which was never accredited to the negotiations.33 The Sudanese government sent reinforcements to the town of Dongola on 20 May, fearing JEM attacks in the Northern State. It accused JEM of working with the opposition Popular Congress, a rival faction of Sudan’s Islamist movement which split away from the ruling NCP, to undermine the DPA and topple the regime. Khartoum said the two seek to persuade field commanders of Minni’s faction to reject the agreement.34 More mundane security problems also have potential to undermine confidence in the DPA. For example, the agreement provides for cantonment of forces as an early step toward disarmament and demobilisation. Experience elsewhere has demonstrated that such concentration of forces – especially forces with loose disciplinary arrangements – often produces acute instability in the early stages. This is aggravated if the process lacks sufficient resources to meet the needs and sustain the interest of

---

31 Crisis Group interviews, SLA delegates, international partners, and AU mediators, Abuja, 11 and 16 April 2006.
32 DPA, Article 27 (341, 342, and 344).
33 On NMRD see fn. 3 above.
34 “Fears of opening a northern front; scores killed in clashes in Darfur”, al-Hayat, 21 May 2006 (Arabic); also “Six killed during rioting protesting the DPA...Khartoum accuses Turabi’s party of coordinating with the Darfur rebels”, al-Hayat, 15 May 2006.
ex-combatants. Likewise, any delays in disarmament and demobilisation would likely result in the further erosion of command and control within the forces on both sides, leading to the emergence of unaffiliated armed groups and increasing banditry.

B. Power Sharing

AU mediators used the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Khartoum government and the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) as the frame of reference for negotiation of the DPA. The CPA has since been enshrined in the country’s interim constitution and cannot be reopened for negotiation. It allocates 52 per cent of positions in the executive and legislative branches at the national and state levels to the ruling NCP and 28 per cent to the SPLM, leaving a mere 14 per cent to all other opposition forces in northern Sudan and 6 per cent to the southern opposition.

These figures arguably under-represent the NCP’s true influence in the government of national unity, since the CPA firmly entrenched all the privileges the NCP had accumulated during sixteen years of de facto one-party rule after its 1989 coup d’état (when it was known as the National Islamic Front) against a democratically elected government. A maze of overt and covert NCP-affiliated organisations and networks control entire sectors of the economy, and the party’s lock on the security structures remains unchallenged.

While Minni was preoccupied with security issues, some senior delegates from his faction shared a broader political agenda with JEM and, to a degree, the SLA/AW as well. Members of all three insurgent delegations argued that Darfur has been historically and systematically marginalised by the central government, and the negotiations offered its people a chance to acquire a genuine stake in the country’s future. JEM alone has a well-articulated national agenda. But Khalil and others within the movement have held positions in the Islamist government, and many within the SLA trust neither him nor his followers. An SLA/AW delegate told Crisis Group: “They [JEM] are the government itself”, echoing broadly held suspicions that JEM has close ties to both the NCP and the Islamist ideologue Hassan Al Turabi’s breakaway Popular Congress. Such suspicions, as well as the political rivalries among the rebels, have made it difficult for them to pursue a common agenda.

1. The presidency

The insurgents wanted Darfur to be represented at the national level by a vice president, a demand that stems from their distrust of the government and is rooted in history. Both the NCP and the SPLM opposed this proposal, on the grounds that it would upset the delicate balance the CPA established in the institution of the presidency. In March 2006, Salva Kiir, the SPLM leader, told SLA/AW delegates that a vice president for Darfur was a “red line”, along with any other provision that reduced the SPLM’s share of power under the CPA.

As a fall back, the Abdel Wahid faction and JEM then demanded that the second vice presidential post, the one held by the NCP’s Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, should be allocated to Darfur. The NCP declared this a “red line” issue as well.

To break the impasse, the AU mediation team introduced the idea of a senior assistant to the president, a position whose incumbent would rank fourth in the presidency and be entitled to participate fully in cabinet and national security council meetings and chair the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA). The office has no standing within the institution of the presidency as defined by the interim constitution, and the incumbent’s advice to the president and the presidency would not be binding. By virtue of chairing the TDRA, however, the senior assistant would become a powerful figure in Darfur and its representative in the national government.

---

35 For analysis of the insurgency’s origins and ideologies, see Crisis Group Report, Unifying Darfur’s Rebels, op. cit.
36 The ruling NCP is the most recent incarnation of the Sudanese Islamist Movement, previously known as the National Islamic Front. Due to internal power struggles, Hassan el-Turabi, the architect and spiritual guide of the Islamist movement split from the current NCP leaders in 2000 and created the Popular Congress (PC). Khalil is a veteran Islamist and former state minister who sided with Turabi and the breakaway PC in 2002.
37 JEM also has ties to armed groups in eastern Sudan. See Section IV C below and Crisis Group Africa Report N°102, Sudan: Saving Peace in the East, 6 January 2006.
38 During its brief periods of democratic government since independence in 1956 (1956-1958; 1964-1969; and 1986-1989), Sudan has followed a Westminster parliamentary model, first with a strong prime minister and a ceremonial presidency (1956-1958) and later with a five-member Council of State. Ruling coalitions ensured that the five members represented the five regions of the country: north, east, south, west and centre. Darfur was always represented in the presidency during these periods. Thus, the Umma Party elected Daoud al-Khalifa Abullahi al-Ta’ishi during the second democracy, 1966 to 1969, and it sent another Darfurian, Ali Hussein Taj a-Din, to the Council from 1986 to 1989.
39 The “presidency” currently consists of the president; the first vice president, a southerner from the SPLM; and the second vice president, who represents the north and is a member of the ruling NCP.
2. The region

The insurgents want the peace deal to establish a regional government for Darfur. As part of its national agenda, JEM proposes that Sudan return to the regional structure abolished in 1989. Both SLA factions support restoration of a regional government, arguing that only such an inclusive structure could implement a Darfur-wide program of reconstruction and reconciliation. Like JEM, they consider the 1994 replacement of the Darfur region by the current three states a unilateral decision of the Islamist government aimed at weakening the region and diluting the power of its largest group, the Fur.

The government opposes establishment of a Darfur region because of the precedent it would set for other regional movements that demand greater autonomy (especially in the East), and the reduced control it would have over this, or any, regional government. As a compromise, the DPA creates a Darfur Transitional Regional Authority (TDRA) for the interim period. It is to have authority over pressing regional issues – reconstruction, security, and implementation of the wealth sharing provisions – but power would remain with the states in other areas. Several commissions are to come under the TDRA: the Darfur Rehabilitation and Resettlement Commission; the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund; the Darfur Land Commission; the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission; the Darfur Peace and Reconciliation Council; and the Darfur Compensation Commission.

The DPA leaves Darfur’s final status – three states or region – for its people to decide in a referendum to be held no later than mid-2010. Unlike JEM, the two SLA factions indicated readiness to accept the referendum. The government accepted that Darfur – whether region or states – be restored to its 1956 borders to the north, and that its southern boundary be determined by the border commission established under the CPA.

3. Representation in the cabinet, general assembly, and civil service

The rebel delegations pressed for Darfur’s representation in political structures at the federal and state levels commensurate with the region’s population, but further augmented through affirmative action to compensate for generations of neglect and marginalisation. They understood that representation in the federal government was sensitive for the SPLM, so wanted to take their share from the 52 per cent the CPA gives the ruling party. The NCP resisted this because it would have seriously weakened its grip on northern Sudanese political life.

As a concession to the rebels, the DPA (Article 17) stipulates that “relevant precedents and population size, where appropriate, shall be used in determining the representation of Darfurians at all levels”. Specifically, Article 8-69(a) states that “the three Cabinet Minister posts and three posts of State Minister held by Darfurians shall continue to be held by Darfurians”. The DPA adds that the insurgents will fill a number of positions, including those of one presidential adviser, one cabinet minister and two state ministers, as well as twelve National Assembly seats and one commission chairmanship.

They will get greater representation inside Darfur: one of three governor positions, and in each of the three states two deputy governor jobs, two ministerial portfolios (of eight) and one adviser slot. They can also divide among themselves 21 seats in each of the three 66-member state legislatures.

These arrangements are less favourable to the Darfur rebels than they may appear, however. The presidency in Khartoum retains considerable powers as the executive body for most key activities. The insurgents may only nominate candidates for senior positions, including Senior Assistant to the President; the presidency chooses among

41 JEM also proposes that the six regions participate in a rotating presidency. Its “Proposal for Change” posted on Sudanjem.com, states: “Regions shall rotate in the position of the President of the Sudan during the interim period. This system shall be reviewed after the first round of six terms covering all the six regions. No region shall hold more than one term at a time”.

42 Unlike the vice presidency, the regional issue was not a serious SPLM concern, as it would not affect its share of federal power.

43 When the government abolished the regional system in 1989, it redivided the northern borders of Darfur to cut off its contact with Egypt, annexing the Egyptian border to Northern State. This was part of a broader redrawing of Sudan’s federal map that subdivided the then nine states into 26 and the eighteen provinces into 72 smaller ones. Instead of devolving power to the grassroots as the government proclaimed, this stretched the state’s meagre resources thinly over a much inflated public sector that was unable to deliver basic social services. A major aim of the changes, several prominent researchers have convincingly argued, was to tighten the nationwide grip of the National Islamic Front by placing its members and co-opted clients in position of influence. See Dr Awad al-Seid al-Karsni (ed.), Studies of Sudan’s federal experience, in Arabic, Political Science Department, University of Khartoum and Frederich Ebert Foundation (Khartoum, 2001).

44 The CPA established, in effect, a NCP/SPLM strategic partnership. The NCP’s domination of the North in this new political dispensation significantly influenced calculations of opposition groups in Darfur, eastern Sudan, Nubia, Kordofan, and elsewhere, who saw armed struggle as the only way to wrest shares of power and wealth from the controlling elites in Khartoum.
them. Furthermore, rivalries among the rebels mean they are likely to compete among themselves for nominations. As a result, it seems likely that the NCP’s overall structural dominance will remain intact.\textsuperscript{45}

4. The electoral calculus

Since the DPA had to be consistent with the CPA’s timeframe for Sudan’s transition to democratic rule, nearly all the power-sharing positions and structures it creates are transitional, to be replaced in three years by elected institutions and office holders. Anticipation of this transition already made itself felt during the Abuja negotiations. The electoral calendar seems to have been a key consideration in the government’s change of attitude early in 2006, which created the opportunity for compromise. Electoral considerations also seem partly to explain the government’s desire to have Abdel Wahid, with his Fur constituency, the largest group in the region, accept the DPA. When he refused, eagerness to return to Darfur to prepare for the 2009 elections seems to have influenced the decision of several SLA/AW leaders to break with him and support the agreement.\textsuperscript{46}

C. Wealth Sharing

The most contentious wealth sharing issue was “compensation”. Simply defining the term was difficult. Article 10 of the Declaration of Principles, agreed by the parties on 6 July 2005, states: “Steps shall be taken to compensate the people of Darfur and address grievances for lives lost, assets destroyed or stolen, and suffering caused”.\textsuperscript{47} The rebels made a clear distinction between reconstruction funding and compensation for individual losses, while the government argued that reconstruction funding was compensation.\textsuperscript{48}

Both the NCP and the SPLM were opposed to direct compensation, though for different reasons. For the NCP to concede a central government responsibility in compensating war victims would be tacit acknowledgement of its responsibility for what it has always described as a tribal conflict. NCP delegates argued that individual compensation claims should be handled by the courts – the same system that has yet to hold anyone to account for atrocities in Darfur. The SPLM opposed compensation on the grounds that the CPA does not authorise compensation to southerners for individual losses.

The movements have been under pressure from the people of Darfur to deliver tangible benefits. Abdel Wahid in particular stands to lose if the wealth sharing deal does not satisfy the IDPs, refugees, and other war victims in his large Fur constituency. Compensation is second only to security and safe return home among IDP priorities. They see it as reparations for harm done to them, and without it, there will be no reconciliation. The government’s agreement to establishment of the Compensation Commission and fund is already an admission of responsibility for events in Darfur. The international community should keep pressure on it to act more responsibly by committing considerably more for this purpose than the $30 million it has pledged.

In the meantime, some private and institutional donors have come up with the idea of a Darfur Victims Assistance Fund, the aim of which would be to help convince Abdel Wahid to sign the DPA. The issue is difficult. Many observers object to the international community helping to underwrite compensation that should come from the government to assist the victims of violence it largely directed. Others counter that compensation is vital to shore up a shaky peace agreement, and Khartoum’s stubbornness should not be allowed to stand in the way. While they do not exclude pressure on the government, they suggest that the priority is to get help to the IDPs and refugees and build support for the DPA. After all, compensation will largely remain moot unless there is much more progress in establishing genuine security on the ground.

\textsuperscript{45} In an open letter dated 7 May 2006 addressed to “those members of the movements who are still reluctant to sign”, six members of the AU mediation team attempted to explain the hurdles they faced: “The Movements did not win the war and were not in a position to dictate their terms. The Government is in power and has no intention of handing over that power at the negotiating table. The Movements did not control a single state capital and controlled very few sizeable towns. The Mediation squeezed many concessions out of the Government. But we would never have been able to squeeze the Government so hard that it agreed to hand over a majority of control at any level of government”. “Explaining the Darfur Peace Agreement: An open letter addressed to those members of the movements who are still reluctant to sign”, Abuja, 7 May 2006, on file with Crisis Group.

\textsuperscript{46} The DPA refers to the three sets of insurgent participants in the negotiation as “movements”. In fact, SLA/MM and SLA/AW are two factions of the original SLA movement, while JEM is a distinct movement in its own right. An exiled Darfur activist who co-signed a letter rejecting the agreement commented to Crisis Group that “the law of the jungle” had triumphed because the international community accepted Khartoum’s bottom lines and so rewarded the party that had flouted international humanitarian law and committed massive atrocities in the war. Crisis Group email exchange, 14 May 2006.

\textsuperscript{47} “Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur”, African Union, Addis Ababa, 5 July 2005

Controversy over compensation of the victims has overshadowed agreement on other components of the wealth sharing protocol. The Compensation Commission and the government’s commitment to provide the seed grant of $30 million were among the factors that encouraged the Minni faction to sign. It is not known how much compensation will be necessary but property losses alone are likely to be significantly higher. Abdel Wahid considers the government contribution inadequate and asks for a large increase, which the government continues to resist. The international community should press the government to contribute additional resources, and the AU and its international partners should join the parties in forming a team to assess what would be a realistic amount for final compensation and recommend a mechanism for dispersing the funds.

The DPA also creates a Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund to assist individual returnees rebuild their homes, restock their livestock, and work their fields. It requires the government to provide $300 million initially and $200 million in 2007 and again in 2008. The international community is committed to hold a donors conference to generate additional resources for reconstruction. Women have a critical role to play in the reconstruction of Darfur, and the international community should ensure their participation in the Joint Assessment Mission and donor conference, as well as mandate that they be involved in disbursing and receiving funds.

Underscoring the need for the fiscal federalism principles set down in the CPA to be implemented fairly and transparently, the DPA proposes to enhance Darfur’s representation in the not yet operational Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission. The CPA and the interim constitution created this body to set formulas for the size and allocation of shares of national revenue to the states of northern Sudan, including the three Darfur states.

A major rebel demand was met by making the traditional system of land holdings known as “Hwakeer” the basis for the settlement of land disputes. The DPA also requires the demilitarisation and protection of traditional migration routes for the seasonal movements of nomads.

Implementation of the wealth sharing protocols will be difficult without government good faith and political will. All the bodies tasked with overseeing the wealth sharing provisions – the Darfur Commissions for Rehabilitation and Resettlement, Reconstruction and Development, Land, and Compensation – depend to a large extent on presidential action. The NCP’s poor track record in meeting its obligations under the more elaborate and internationally backed CPA does not augur well for Darfur.

D. THE DARFUR-DARFUR DIALOGUE AND CONSULTATION

The DPA calls for the convening of a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation 60 days after its entry in force. This conference is designed to broaden buy-in and deal with underlying core issues such as land ownership and rights, but is also expected to discuss overarching issues like inter-communal reconciliation, the safe return of IDP’s and refugees, traditional grazing routes and the broader relationship between pastoral and farming communities. Powerful constituencies that were left out during the DPA process or chose to opt out of it, such as the government-backed militias (including the Janjaweed), many groups of Arab origin and the insurgents who refused to sign, would all expect to be fairly represented. However, the DPA identifies the Consultation as merely an “advisory and facilitation mechanism”, empowered only to “make recommendations and observations to the national and Darfur authorities, including community leaders”. 50

The government and Darfur rebels have both attempted in the past to appropriate or manipulate communal reconciliation mechanisms for partisan use. The inclusion of their representatives in the preparatory committee for the Consultation (Article 473) greatly weakens the credibility of the process. The AU and the UN should strive to make the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation as inclusive and transparent a process as possible, including by guaranteeing women significant participation at all stages.

IV. POST-AGREEMENT DYNAMICS

A. FURTHER SLA FRAGMENTATION?

After Abdel Wahid refused to sign the DPA, a group of his followers led by Abdel Rahman Musa, the lead negotiator of the faction, dissented and took part in the signing ceremony at the last moment. This signalled emergence of what could become another movement, but one led by political cadres and commanders from ethnic groups other than the Fur. The dissenting leaders belong to the Birgid, Daju, Berti, and Tunjur groups as well as some Arab groups of North and South Darfur. The split was clearly

49 The Janjaweed and Sudanese soldiers looted hundreds of villages; livestock stolen during the conflict has appeared in Libya, Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon, and the Central African Republic. Crisis Group interview, SLA/AW delegate, Abuja, 12 April 2006.

50 Article 31 (469-470).
over whether to sign the DPA: several in Abdel Wahid’s entourage thought his refusal was unreasonable in light of what they considered persuasive international implementation guarantees.\(^{51}\)

The dissenters were apparently keen to distinguish themselves from the Abdel Wahid and Minni Minawi factions. When asked about their next step, Musa told Crisis Group: “Before security arrangements, before power sharing, convening a constituent convention as soon as possible is our top priority”. Minni Minawi sent representatives to talk to them, and they agreed to coordinate with his faction.\(^{52}\)

Shortly thereafter, Ibrahim Madebo, the chief SLA/AW negotiator in the power sharing commission, broke away, also complaining about Abdel Wahid’s hesitancy. Madebo is a descendant of the paramount chief of the large Rezeigat Arab tribe of South Darfur. His presence in the SLA/AW at the head of a strong Arab contingent and as lead negotiator bolstered the faction’s claims to include all Darfur people and contributed to the neutrality the Rezeigat have observed during the conflict. The breakaway of these blocs has considerably narrowed SLA/AW’s support base. Given the leadership crisis, it is unlikely the SLA/AW will be able to restore a unified political and military command. A rapprochement appears likely between the new bloc of smaller African and Arab groups and SLA/Minni (mostly Zaghawa fighters), which need to coordinate their initiatives for implementation of the DPA. The JEM (Zaghawa), on the other hand, might seek closer links with Abdel-Wahid’s largely Fur faction.

The SLA/MM also experienced serious post-DPA tensions. Minni Minawi faced growing opposition on his home ground, Dar Zaghawa in Northern Darfur, where the abusive conduct of his fighters had alienated the locals. The arbitrary detention on 20 May of the 61 year-old commander Suliman Jamous, SLA/MM humanitarian coordinator and contact point for the International Criminal Court, for refusing to endorse the DPA seriously damaged Minni Minawi’s credibility. The detention and torture by SLA/MM commanders of seventeen of Jamous’s followers and family members further tarnished the faction’s human rights image.\(^{53}\) Further, a group of the faction’s commanders opposed to the DPA allied with Sharif Harir, a vocal critic of the agreement.

### B. WINNING OVER ABDEL WAHID

The AU mediation and its international partners welcomed the dissenters at first since they appeared to broaden the support base of the agreement but Abdel Wahid remains the official head of the faction, and securing his signature is crucial for building acceptance of the accord.

Protests turned violent at the sprawling Kalma camp shortly after the 5 May signing. Demonstrations broke out at Zalengi town and elsewhere in Darfur and have continued.\(^{54}\) On 13 May, IDPs who support Abdel Wahid demonstrated against the DPA in Abu Shouk camp near El Fasher. A similar demonstration the following day in Kass, South Darfur, left three people dead. Some demonstrators threw rocks at AU vehicles and burned parts of the AU compound.\(^{55}\) An international aid worker in Darfur told Crisis Group: “The peace agreement has no legitimacy or support here. It has actually caused more problems, for the time being. No one seems to really believe in it, or adhere to it. The AU has lost all capacity to deal with the situation”.\(^{56}\) Students from Darfur demonstrated in the centre of Khartoum, shouting rejection of the agreement and calling its signatories traitors.

The protests came as a reminder of the critical need to associate the people of Darfur with the agreement and explain its provisions to them. Despite the tremendous pressures on Abdel Wahid to sign, including the threat of international sanctions, the protests seem to have encouraged him to hold out. In a 14 May letter to the AU, he reiterated his three key demands: adequate compensation for war victims; more SLA participation in critical phases of the security arrangements, namely protection of IDPs and refugees as they return home and in the monitoring of Janjaweed disarmament; and a better deal in political representation in Khartoum and at the state level.

In protracted discussions with Abdel Wahid that followed the 5 May signing ceremony in Abuja and continued in Nairobi, some AU mediators identified a procedural fix to accommodate SLA/AW demands without reopening the DPA. Khartoum initially accepted it – attachment to the agreement of a supplementary letter casting the three SLA concerns as “clarifications” of relevant articles on implementation.\(^{57}\) Additional SLA/AW demands for

\(^{51}\) Crisis Group telephone interviews, Abdel Rahman Musa, May 2006.

\(^{52}\) Ibid.

\(^{53}\) “SLM detains two rebel leaders for their rejection of Darfur peace deal”, Sudan Tribune, 9 June 2006.

\(^{54}\) Demonstrations by the IDPs in a camp near the town of Zalengi on 8 May 2006 were violently repressed by government security forces, with 30 people injured and a similar number detained; see “Important statement on behalf of IDPs at Zalengi”, 9 May 2006, at Sudaneseonline.com.

\(^{55}\) Crisis Group correspondence, May 2006.

\(^{56}\) Crisis Group correspondence with international aid worker, 27 May 2006.

\(^{57}\) Crisis Group email exchanges and telephone interviews, SLA/AW leadership, May 2006.
larger shares of power and national wealth for the region, however, were considered as going too far because they would require renegotiation of the DPA. Abdel Wahid asked, therefore, that the clarification letter include an AU commitment to mediate new political talks between the government and the SLA/AW on these issues. The salvage operation reached a dead end when the chief AU mediator, Salim Ahmed Salim, balked at committing the organisation to a renewed process, and the government appeared less disposed to allow a supplement to the DPA.

The episode indicates that ways to broaden DPA buy-in and address its weaknesses are within reach. The ideal forum in which to address the fundamental structural adjustments needed to alleviate decades of marginalisation of Sudan’s peripheral areas, including Darfur, would be a comprehensive national dialogue conference, mandated to address structural inequities in the distribution of power and wealth at the national level.58

While members of the AU mediation team worked hard, it appeared there was no clear way to secure Abdel Wahid’s buy-in, and in his address to the AU Peace and Security Council on 15 May, Salim Ahmed Salim appeared to suggest he was giving up on it. The PSC nonetheless extended the signing deadline, first to the end of May, then by a few more days to allow time for SPLM leader and First Vice President Salva Kiir to bring the two SLA factions together in southern Sudan in an effort to soften the holdout’s resistance. However, only Minni Minawa attended: though he had requested the meeting, Abdel Wahid snubbed it, and the SLA/AW stated from Nairobi that it no longer acknowledged the DPA; retracted its earlier consent to a supplementary document; and called for the UN to take over the mediation. This brought the faction’s credibility to a new low and appears likely to trigger further defections.59

Unlike JEM, which has been ambiguous about its military intentions (see below), the SLA/AW has said it will abide by the ceasefire while continuing to resist the DPA through political means. The SLA/AW has since sought to get political mileage from the demonstrations that continued for weeks throughout Sudan, including in the IDP camps in Darfur. Because of the agreement’s fragility and the imperative of broadening its constituency, efforts to associate JEM, Abdel Wahid, and the emerging rebel blocs should continue even after the deadline, though at least JEM is unlikely to be persuaded.

C. JEM’S POSITION

Unlike the SLA factions, JEM’s fight is national in character, aimed at defeating the ruling NCP. The movement has established branches throughout Sudan to underscore its national status and agenda. While having a small armed force on the ground in Darfur, it maintains an active military presence in eastern Sudan as an ally of the regional armed movement known as the Eastern Front, which is fighting for a more equitable regional share of national power and wealth and for recognition of its distinct cultural identity.60 These factors make it highly unlikely that JEM can be won over to the DPA.

As discussed below, JEM expects to benefit from the Chad government’s support, which should strengthen its capacity to act as a military spoiler, either in Darfur, or the East. Sabotage of the growing strategic infrastructure in the East – oil pipelines, refineries, automated port facilities and highways – would hurt the government badly and unleash a wave of repression in the region.

Political players on the national scene are increasingly convinced that the demands JEM made in Abuja could only be addressed within the framework of a broader national dialogue on the restructuring of power and governance, involving the NCP, its militant dissident faction, the Popular Congress, and other opposition and civil society organisations.

The AU has implicitly rejected the SLA/AW and JEM demands but it extended the deadline again to its 1-2 July Banjul summit in the hope of winning them over by addressing some of their key concerns during the implementation phase. In the meantime, on 8 June, the AU allowed four SLA/AW and JEM dissidents who had satisfied the criteria of demonstrable control over fighters and/or political influence on the ground, to sign a “Declaration of Support of the DPA”.61 The document commits Abdel Rahman Musa Abbakar, Ibrahim Madebo, and Commander Adam Salih Abbakar of the SLA/AW, and Adam Abdel Rahim Abu Risha, the secretary general of JEM in South Darfur, and their followers, to accept the letter and spirit of the DPA and especially to implement the obligations arising from the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement and related security arrangements.62

58 The kind national conference referred to here would be designed to address the structural flaws of governance at the national level. The Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation provided for in the DPA is intended to address the root causes of the Darfur conflict and facilitate intercommunal reconciliation.


60 For more details on the situation in eastern Sudan, see Crisis Group Report, Saving Peace in the East, op. cit.

61 Crisis Group telephone interviews with members of the AU mediation team, June 2006.

The DPA holdouts signed a statement in Asmara denouncing it as a quick fix and urging the international community to consult with them on the way forward. They invited Minni Minawi to join them and expressed understanding of the pressures he was under to sign the DPA. In addition to Abdel Wahid and Khalil Ibrahim, the better known holdouts, the Asmara declaration was signed by Khamis Abdallah Abakar, vice president of the SLA since its inception and the leader of the movement’s important Massaleit constituency. Khamis was among the nineteen commanders who sought to stop Abdel Wahid in early 2006, when they suspected his involvement in secret talks with the government but that rift between the two has been healed. Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige, the chairman of the Federal Democratic Alliance (FDA) and a former Darfur governor, and Sharif Harir, a co-founder of the FDA who has emerged as the political leader of dissident SLA/MM commanders opposed to Minni Minawi and the DPA, also signed.

V. THE CHAD DIMENSION

Chad’s crisis is primarily internal, as reflected in the collapse of social services, rampant corruption, and derailment of the democratisation process due to President Déby’s insistence on running for a third term. The fusion of the country’s domestic dynamics with the Darfur conflict has created a volatile mix that might have already been fatal for Déby’s regime had he not received logistical and intelligence support from the French military based in the country. To draw attention away from the internal crisis, Déby placed all blame for the April attack on Khartoum, severed diplomatic relations and withdrew Chad’s delegates from the mediation team in Abuja.

Nevertheless, Chad welcomed signature of the DPA. It had earlier said such a deal was needed to help stop the flow of refugees and rebels from Darfur into its territory but it warned that it had to be enforced by a robust UN peacekeeping mission. The Chadian government hopes that a UN force in Darfur can help stem incursions by rebel groups based in the troubled region, who receive considerable support from Sudan’s government. A secure border would free Déby to consolidate his tenuous hold on power, including by repressing the weakened political and civil society opposition.

Two rebel alliances lead the assault on the regime, while a host of smaller armed groups are fighting in remote regions. FUCD (United Front for Democracy and Liberty) is dominated by the Tama people, but includes smaller elements of Arab descent. Led by Mohamat Nur Abdel-Kerim, a former army officer, it has considerable backing from Khartoum. It led the mid-April offensive against N’Djamena that was beaten back from the city’s outskirts with heavy losses.

The Rally of Democratic Forces (RaFD) includes dissidents from the inner circles of power and Déby’s own Bedeiyat clan of the Zaghawa people who are opposed to his third presidential term. While these seek to distance themselves from Déby’s costly failures and to maintain their prominence in the country’s leadership, the FUCD appears determined to remove Zaghawa influence in Chad altogether.

Hardliners in the Sudanese army and other security forces and the ruling NCP share the same objective of undermining Zaghawa power since they are convinced the ruling circles in Chad back the Darfur rebels. Khartoum, therefore, allowed FUCD to build its forces in West Darfur during the months before the April attack. In turn, Déby and his entourage encouraged the SLA/MM and JEM, in which Sudanese Zaghawa dominate, to coordinate military and political action under an alliance launched in January 2006. Several serving and former Sudanese government officials are involved in stoking a virulent hate campaign, alleging the Zaghawa are responsible for the war in Darfur and suggesting their goal is to establish a Greater Zaghawa State over large swaths of Darfur, Chad, and Libya. The Khartoum newspaper al-Intibaha, whose editor-in-chief is a close relative of President al-Bashir and a former government minister, is the leading vehicle of the campaign.

Crisis Group sources say JEM fighters were among the loyalists who fought back the FUCD attack in April, thus gaining the movement considerable influence in Chad following Déby’s re-election the following month. Chadian support makes it easier for JEM to resist international pressures to join the DPA, while continued Khartoum backing for the Chadian armed opposition would cause hardliners around Déby to respond in kind, perpetuating what is already a full-blown proxy war between the two countries.

In a major blunder that could prove costly to JEM, however, elements from that movement stormed the Sudanese embassy in N’Djamena on 20 April, occupying it for several hours. The government unconvincingly expressed dismay and expelled JEM’s chairman, Khalil Ibrahim, from the country. The breach of international law

63 “Chad welcomes Darfur peace accord”, Sudan Tribune, 9 May 2006; also, “UN must back any Darfur peace deal – Chad’s FM”, Reuters, 2 May 2006.

64 Crisis Group email exchanges, several Chad watchers, April and May 2006.

65 “Chad expels rebel leader after occupation of Sudanese embassy”, Sudan Tribune, 21 April 2006.
may render Ibrahim, a political refugee in France, more vulnerable to international pressure.

Developments between the two countries will depend to a large extent on how far Déby is willing to back JEM, which in turn is likely to be a function of what Khartoum does with his enemies. The presence of a robust UN peacekeeping force, however, would help contain the proxy war.

VI. THE TRANSITION TO A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE

Crisis Group has long argued for a more robust international force in Darfur with a mandate to protect civilians and support the fledgling peace process. With the important exception of Khartoum, few dispute the need. Insufficient international political will, however, has resulted in lengthy delays both to reinforce and replace AMIS.\(^{66}\) As security in Darfur deteriorated throughout 2005 and the under-funded, under-staffed, and under-equipped AMIS proved helpless to turn the tide, the presumption that a UN force would have to take over grew stronger. In December 2005, a second AU-led assessment mission argued that, even under ideal conditions, international presence in Darfur would be “required for at least two-three [more] years”, and that “early consideration [should] be given to all viable alternatives for maintaining a peace support operation in Darfur…cognisant of the uncertainty of sustaining funding based on a system of voluntary contribution”.\(^{67}\)

With AMIS on the verge of bankruptcy by January 2006, the AU and its international partners agreed to extend the AMIS mandate to the end of March in exchange for an AU agreement “in principle” to a transition to a UN operation. On 10 March, the AU Peace and Security Council extended AMIS’s mandate to 30 September, on the informal understanding with donors that a UN force would then take over. UN Security Council Resolution 1663 (24 March 2006) instructed the Secretary-General to “expedite the necessary preparatory planning for transition of AMIS to a United Nations operation”\(^{68}\) and requested a report on “a range of options for a United Nations operation in Darfur”, as well as means for providing UN support to AMIS until the operation was launched.

Sudan’s government has continued to obstruct UN/AU preparatory work. It refused to allow a UN-led team to assess the situation inside Darfur and the requirements for a UN Mission while the Abuja negotiations were underway, so Secretary-General Kofi Annan was unable to report fully to the Security Council by the 24 April deadline, despite repeated attempts to entice Khartoum to cooperate.\(^{69}\) Without the assessment mission, “an indispensable step in the planning process”, according to Assistant Secretary-General Hédi Annabi, the transition stopped in its tracks.\(^{70}\)

The signing of the DPA removed Khartoum’s excuse and offered an opportunity for stronger Security Council pressure. On 16 May, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted Resolution 1679, which “call[ed] for the deployment of a joint African Union and United Nations technical assessment mission” within one week and urged an accelerated transition to a UN operation in Darfur. The language, however, was notably weaker than that of another paragraph in the same resolution, which threatened targeted sanctions against those who “violate or attempt to block the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement.” Refusing to sign the DPA or obstructing it, the Council seemed to say, was the immediate priority problem that could merit “strong and effective measures” – sanctions. Flouting the Council’s request for cooperation with AU and UN transition preparations did not.

Despite three Security Council presidential statements and two resolutions calling for unhindered UN planning,\(^{71}\) Khartoum rightly sensed it could afford to drag its feet further. It was not until 25 May, after Annan had dispatched to Khartoum the veteran envoy Lakhdar Brahimi and

---

\(^{66}\) As early as March 2005, the first AU-led assessment mission argued that AMIS should aim to “contribute to a secure environment throughout Darfur in order to enable full returns of displaced persons….The benchmark for success in this phase would be the return and resumption of livelihoods of IDPs and refugees with levels of security comparable to that which existed before the outbreak of the current conflict in February 2003”. The planners argued that this phase should “be timed for completion prior to the spring 2006 planting season” and would require an AU decision by September 2005, as well as “some 12,300 military, police and civilian personnel.”

\(^{67}\) In a Presidential Statement, 3 February 2006, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to “initiate contingency planning without delay … on a range of options for a possible transition from AMIS to a United Nations operation”.

\(^{68}\) In a Presidential Statement, 11 April 2006, the Security Council called for “a United Nations assessment mission to visit Darfur by 30 April 2006” but it did not penalise Khartoum for refusing. Sudanese President al-Bashir turned down Kofi Annan, and his government brushed aside the request of Assistant Secretary-General Hédi Annabi, who visited Khartoum in April.

\(^{69}\) Colum Lynch, “Sudan’s Bashir rebuffs UN on peacekeepers”, The Washington Post, 27 April 2006; see also 5 April and 19 May reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Darfur.

\(^{70}\) Presidential Statements of 3 February, 11 April, and 9 May 2006 and Resolutions 1663 (23 March) and 1679 (16 May).
Annabi, that the UN gained grudging Sudanese approval for the assessment mission. That mission – led by Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno – travelled to Addis Ababa on 7 June and, after subsequent consultations with the government in Khartoum, finally arrived in Darfur on 13 June. Its report to the Security Council is not expected before the end of June.

Guéhenno’s team knocked on the same doors that, several days before, the representatives of the Security Council had failed to open in person. The Council, in a week-long, early-June mission to Addis Ababa, Sudan and Chad, attempted to buttress the peace processes in Sudan and secure agreement to the UN transition in Darfur. However, the representatives of all fifteen member states of the Council, including ten ambassadors, returned to New York without the desired unequivocal Sudanese agreement.

Khartoum continues to send mixed signals to both the Security Council mission and the UN/AU assessment team, thereby reigniting fears of further delay. While agreeing to an expanded UN role in Darfur, the Sudanese government still objects to a robust peacekeeping operation. Whether the Security Council will now act swiftly and establish an effective UN force in Darfur before the end of 2006 is uncertain at best. It remains divided: China and Russia, as well as some non-permanent members, have already echoed Khartoum’s objections to a Chapter VII mission and repeatedly blocked strong pressure, such as targeted sanctions against senior Khartoum or rebel officials, despite the prolonged crisis and the evidence of non-compliance with Council demands.

The difficulties are likely to become more acute when the mandate and the objectives of the UN mission are considered. The brittle DPA has such an array of possible spoilers that anything less than a large, full-fledged Chapter VII mission instructed to protect civilians and help implement the peace agreement would multiply the risk of failure of both the UN operation in Darfur and the peace process as a whole. Sudan’s government can be expected to seek to exploit divisions within the AU and the wider international community, as well as between the two, to delay, weaken, and perhaps even derail the UN mission.

Some diplomats suggest a full Chapter VII mandate would not only be politically difficult to agree but perhaps also unnecessary. They argue that it would be sufficient for an otherwise Chapter VI mission to obtain a Chapter VII authorisation limited to protecting civilians “in the areas of deployment, within capabilities, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan”, provided that capable UN troops under a commander willing to act proactively were given robust rules of engagement. Such a compromise, which would essentially extend to Darfur the mandate of the UNMIS mission that is already in Sudan to help implement the CPA, has surface appeal but is problematic. If past UN peacekeeping experience is a guide, it would be risky to expect that failure to agree on a clear definition of one of the mission’s core objectives would be made good on the ground by troops and commanders attempting to divine the expectations of their political masters.

That the UN struggled even to field an assessment team in the face of deliberate Sudanese obstruction is another stark reminder that a UN mission in Darfur will operate in a semi-permissive environment at best. Even if all rebel movements and factions sign on to the DPA, the text of that agreement – which does not spell out a specific UN role – would need to be supplemented by an unambiguous memorandum of understanding between the world organisation and the Sudanese parties authorising UNMIS-Darfur to assume the responsibilities of AMIS under the DPA. Without this, the UN mission might find itself dependent on Sudanese permission for every major step, in a replay of the disastrous peacekeeping experience in Bosnia during the early 1990s.

Countries with advanced military capabilities should work with the UN to ensure that the peacekeeping force has a robust rapid reaction capability so that it can take quick military action against ceasefire violators and any faction engaged in clear provocations. Such a capability is essential to send a strong message to potential spoilers, whether rebels or government, that the force is credible, serious and able to establish a secure environment. Similarly, countries with advanced military capabilities should detail senior officers to the headquarters of the peacekeeping force to bolster its professionalism.

Meanwhile AMIS remains in dire need of reinforcement. Working with international partners, the AU should modify AMIS’s operational concept, specify the requirements for raising its efficiency and numbers and request generous donor assistance. Without immediate support, AMIS will fail even to begin its multiple DPA tasks and thus indirectly endanger the peace agreement.

---

73 Crisis Group interviews, June 2006.
74 The communiqué of the AU’s Peace and Security Committee stressed the need to review AMIS’s mandate and increase its strength significantly – actions consistent with the assumption that many troops currently deployed with AMIS would eventually be “rehatted” as UN peacekeepers.
To meet the challenge, AMIS has indicated that it needs five additional battalions within two months. The AU’s international partners have agreed to provide strategic transport, train AMIS commanders to take charge of the increased capabilities and troops and certify elements for absorption into a UN peacekeeping operation. Alarmingly, some experts have now begun to argue that the inability to agree quickly on implementation concepts may mean that the first of the five battalions cannot be deployed before October and the final one until February or March 2007.75

More energetic intra-AU and AU-donor cooperation is required to secure these much-needed reinforcements on an accelerated schedule.

The UN Secretary-General has worked hard to secure agreement for a donors conference to support implementation of this AMIS reinforcement plan, which is expected to take place in Brussels on 7 July. It is now up to the AU to present a convincing package proposal to secure funding from donors, some of whom may be reluctant to sponsor what is seen as a mission on its last legs. But without adequate AMIS support, the DPA is likely to unravel before the UN operation takes over in Darfur. That, in turn, would make the UN task more difficult, perhaps impossible. Additionally, of course, a larger, more effective AMIS could pave the way for a smoother transition to the UN by making a greater impact on the security and humanitarian situation in the interim.

In recent days, however, there has been increasing talk that the AU at its 1-2 July summit may extend the AMIS mandate to the end of the year. This parallels the suggestion heard more and more that it will be January or February 2007 at the earliest before a UN mission can be deployed. The surface plausibility of such an extension of the AMIS mandate, especially in view of the uncertainty regarding Khartoum’s position on a UN takeover, is more than counter-balanced by the certainty that it would have a chilling effect on the donor response to any AU funding proposal and on the preparations in New York necessary to take over responsibility from the AU in a timely fashion, where there is already a suggestion that at least six months will be needed to get a mission on the ground in Darfur once it has been authorized by the Security Council.76

It is critical that the transition to a UN force in Darfur occur on or around 30 September 2006, when the AMIS mandate is presently due to expire. The longer the takeover is postponed, the less legitimate the DPA will become to many in Darfur, where there is already little confidence in it and in AMIS. A transition on or around 1 October is still possible if it it is treated as urgent. As soon as possible after the authorisation has been secured, a rapid reaction element should be deployed. It would serve as the first component of the UN force, with directions especially to ensure the protection of civilians while the UN proceeds with the inevitably time consuming task of putting together the full mission.

Over the longer term, Khartoum’s delaying tactics seem intended to achieve one of three possible outcomes, all of which would be disastrous for the people of Darfur:

- Prevent a transition from AMIS to a UN mission. Khartoum is aware that this is probably not realistic, given the international environment, but continues to hedge, presumably to extract concessions on the mandate, composition and operations of the eventual UN force.

- Limit a UN mission to a Chapter VI mandate, which would severely compromise its capacity to protect civilians and probably render compliance with the DPA entirely voluntary, while denying the force meaningful capacity to prevent or respond to ceasefire violations. Given the likely persistence of violence in Darfur for the foreseeable future, it would also expose peacekeepers to higher risk.

- Postpone deployment long enough for the DPA to unravel or become unenforceable. Khartoum enjoys military superiority and has divided the rebels during the negotiations. It may seek to buy time and relative freedom of action to alter the situation on the ground significantly before UN deployment.

Any of these outcomes would not only render much of the DPA obsolete but also leave many of the root causes of the Darfur conflict unresolved and permit Khartoum to establish a new status quo before yet another round of negotiations. The humanitarian crisis in Darfur and neighbouring Chad would be unnecessarily prolonged, and for many refugees and IDPs, who have been “cleansed” from the region, the prospects of returning home would become even more remote.

As transparent as Khartoum’s motives may appear, it is a fact of life that neither the Security Council nor any other international body or big power is likely to support sending a mission that needs to shoot its way into Darfur against the wishes of the Sudanese government. That means the international community must formulate a strategy to bring Khartoum to accept a robust UN force. That will not be easy but the framework of such a strategy might include the following five elements:

- concentration on obtaining the African Union’s unequivocal support for transitioning the AMIS mission to the UN;

75 Crisis Group interviews, May/June 2006.
76 Crisis Group interviews, April, May, June 2006.
persuading the Arab League to advocate the advantages of a UN mission to Khartoum;

- pressing for agreement of the African members of the Security Council, Russia, China and Qatar that if Khartoum remains recalcitrant, strong pressure will be applied, including, if necessary, some form of sanctions;

- reassurance to the Sudanese government that a strong Chapter VII UN mission in Darfur will not violate the country’s “sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity”; and

- incentives for compliance, such as the lifting of bilateral or multilateral sanctions and promises to contribute to the Darfur compensation fund.

VII. CONCLUSION

Sudan’s government conceded little during the Abuja negotiations to the demands of Darfur’s rebels for a greater share in national decision making and a fairer share of revenues for their region. This considerably reduced the appeal of the DPA that was signed in May 2006. Whether that agreement will hold now largely depends on whether the parties observe its security provisions and peacekeepers of the African Union, and eventually the UN, can hold at bay the many spoilers on both sides who want to undermine it.

A major weakness of the agreement is that it assigns to the government the responsibility to disarm its own Janjaweed militias, the main perpetrators of massive atrocities against civilians, despite the government’s dismal record of ignoring five previous commitments to do this.

The DPA tasks the AU Mission (AMIS) with carrying out most of its military aspects, including verification of the assembly and disarmament of the Janjaweed and, subsequently, rebel fighters; establishment and enforcement of buffer zones around IDP camps and the main humanitarian corridors; and separation of the parties’ respective areas of control. However, AMIS lacks the capacity to do these additional jobs – it is struggling to fulfil its current mandate of monitoring compliance with the existing ceasefire that none of the parties have observed and protecting civilians where it is deployed.

The peace agreement makes no mention of the necessary UN takeover of Darfur peacekeeping operations. Close coordination between the AU and the UN is critical if the DPA is to succeed during the intermediary period before a handover that needs to happen before October. Given the fragility of the agreement and the many challenges, the UN should prepare for a robust mission, with a clear mandate to protect civilians under Chapter VII of the Charter and the capability to contain rebel spoilers as well as government hardliners who may be tempted to continue experimenting with regime change across the border in Chad.

Nairobi/Brussels, 20 June 2006

---

77 Terms of reference of the UNSC mission to Addis Ababa, Sudan, and Chad. (S/2006/341).
APPENDIX B

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with nearly 120 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by the former European Commissioner for External Relations Christopher Patten and Boeing’s Senior Vice-President, International Relations and former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

Crisis Group's international headquarters are in Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow. The organisation currently operates fourteen field offices (in Amman, Bishkek, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, Dushanbe, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kabul, Nairobi, Pretoria, Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi), with analysts working in over 50 crisis-affected countries and territories across four continents. In Africa, this includes Angola, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, the Sahel region, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole region from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia, the Andean region and Haiti.


June 2006

Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org
International Headquarters
149 Avenue Louise, 1050 Brussels, Belgium · Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 · Fax: +32 2 502 50 38
E-mail: brussels@crisisgroup.org

New York Office
420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 2640, New York 10170 · Tel: +1 212 813 0820 · Fax: +1 212 813 0825
E-mail: newyork@crisisgroup.org

Washington Office
1629 K Street, Suite 450, Washington DC 20006 · Tel: +1 202 785 1601 · Fax: +1 202 785 1630
E-mail: washington@crisisgroup.org

London Office
Cambridge House - Fifth Floor, 100 Cambridge Grove, London W6 0LE · Tel: +44 20 7031 0230 · Fax: +44 20 7031 0231
E-mail: london@crisisgroup.org

Moscow Office
Belomorskaya st., 14-1 - Moscow 125195 Russia · Tel/Fax: +7-495-455-9798
E-mail: moscow@crisisgroup.org

Regional & Local Field Offices
Crisis Group also operates from some 20 different locations in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America.
See www.crisisgroup.org for details.

www.crisisgroup.org