Darfur Update  
June 6, 2008

Introduction

As the conflict in Darfur enters its sixth year, conditions continue to deteriorate for civilians. Hundreds of thousands of people have been killed, even by the most conservative estimates. The United Nations puts the death toll at roughly 300,000, while the former U.N. undersecretary-general puts the number at no less than 400,000.\(^1\) Up to 2.5 million Darfuris have fled their homes and continue to live in camps throughout Darfur, or in refugee camps in neighboring Chad and the Central African Republic. Based on Sudan’s behavior over the past five years, it is clear that unless the international community imposes additional political costs for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s intransigence, his government will continue to buy time by accepting initiatives only to backtrack later or impose new conditions that render them useless.

Humanitarian assistance in Darfur continues to be at risk of collapse, in part because of sustained harassment by the Sudanese government, and in part because of the government’s militia allies and common criminals. In September 2006, the United Nations estimated that such a collapse would cause up to 100,000 civilian deaths every month.\(^2\) Troublesome developments suggest that such a failure is becoming more likely: the World Food Program’s Humanitarian Air Service received no funding in the first three months of 2008.\(^3\) Last-minute donations totaling six million dollars funded it through the beginning of May.\(^4\)

In the second half of 2007, the Sudanese government’s divide-and-conquer strategy, described by Human Rights Watch as “chaos by design,”\(^5\) caused an increasingly frenzied free-for-all in Darfur. Rebel groups fragmented further and criminal activity as well as intertribal fighting increased exponentially.\(^6\) Still, the effects of tribal fighting should not be overemphasized. Of the eight largest displacements between January and November 2007, seven resulted from government or Janjaweed attacks. Only one was the result of intertribal

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\(^1\) Edith M. Lederer, "UN Says Darfur Conflict Worsening, with Perhaps 300,000 Dead," Associated Press 22 April 2008.
\(^4\) “WFP Sudan’s Air Operation Gets One-Month Reprieve from Closure,” United Nations World Food Programme 28 March 2008.
fighting. In early 2008, deaths and displacements from military operations by the government, its allied militias and rebels were even more common relative to those caused by tribal conflicts.

Worsening Humanitarian Crisis

The number of people driven from their homes as a result of Khartoum’s military campaign in Darfur is growing at an alarming pace. In the first nine months of 2007, more than 250,000 civilians abandoned their homes for camps that were already filled beyond capacity. By year’s end, there were 280,000 newly displaced people. Of those, nearly 175,000 were in South Darfur, although there was a sharp spike in violence and displacement in West Darfur in the beginning of 2008.

There is no room for new arrivals in most camps. All camps in or near Nyala and al-Fasher, the capitals of South and North Darfur, respectively, were full by the end of June 2007. Al-Salam camp in South Darfur, has an official capacity of 14,000. Al-Salam housed 3,500 in January 2007, 13,300 in March 2007 and over 33,000 in early July 2007. By the end of June, there were over 51,000 inhabitants in al-Salam, and hundreds more who settled on its outskirts because they were refused admittance. Those individuals were since relocated to other crowded camps. Gunmen entering the camps to loot and harass civilians and aid workers make the problem worse.

It is no surprise then that all indicators point to a sicker, hungrier population. Child malnutrition rates, considered to be among the best humanitarian barometers, for Darfuri children under five reached 16.1 percent in 2007, compared to 12.9 percent in 2006. The rate surpassed the 15 percent emergency threshold for the first time since 2004, according to a December 2007 United Nations study. For children six to 29 months old, the malnutrition rate was an alarming 21.3 percent. Malnutrition rates could be even higher, considering that publication of more than six nutrition surveys from the last nine months are held up by Khartoum. In North Darfur, where malnutrition is highest, the governor decided that malnutrition surveys can only take place between May and June or October and November, regardless of conditions on the ground. The governor also scrutinizes results before release.

8 “Sudan—Darfur: Humanitarian Profile—September 2007,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs September 2007. The exact number of newly displaced persons from January until September was 265,813.
10 Ibid
15 Ibid
16 Ibid
A spike in humanitarian vehicle hijacks is forcing many organizations to deliver food by airplane. Because air deliveries cost much more than land deliveries, they have usually been reserved for the most inaccessible areas. Air delivery is rapidly depleting organizations’ financial resources. The rainy season starting in June will cause food deliveries to drop off considerably. It is essential that food be stockpiled before then, when demand could increase by 50 percent.\(^{17}\)

The sharp and sudden rise in global food prices,\(^{18}\) which already resulted in riots in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, is also restricting rainy season stockpiles. The price of cereals in one location increased by 500 percent.\(^{19}\) Instability and rising prices account for a 50 percent cut in daily World Food Program deliveries, from 1,800 metric tons to 900 metric tons.\(^{20}\) As of May, cereal rations shrunk by half to 225 grams a day per person, pulses by half to 30 grams and sugar by half to 15 grams. Kilocalories have gone down by 40 percent, to 1,242 per day from the recommended rate of 2,156 per day.\(^{21}\)

Sexual violence as a tool of war for Sudanese government forces and allied militias is extensively documented by independent human rights organizations and the U.N.\(^{22}\) As Human Rights Watch reported in April, "it is almost impossible to accurately quantify the prevalence of sexual violence in Darfur... given the secrecy surrounding the issue."\(^{23}\) But there is ample evidence to show that sexual violence is practiced increasingly by rebels and common criminals. Women who were once targeted when they left the camps to collect firewood or other essentials now find themselves unsafe inside the camps as well.

**Humanitarian groups under increased pressure**

Over thirteen thousand humanitarian relief workers provide aid to roughly 4.2 million Darfuris, about two-thirds of the area’s total population. Attacks against humanitarian workers increased 150 percent from June 2006 to June 2007.\(^{24}\) From January to November 2007 alone:

- 128 vehicles owned or leased by humanitarian organizations were hijacked;
- 74 humanitarian convoys were attacked, ambushed or looted;
- 18 humanitarian personnel were injured;
- 58 humanitarian personnel were arrested or detained;
- 131 humanitarian personnel were kidnapped;
- 59 humanitarian personnel were physically or sexually assaulted;

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\(^{18}\) According to the WFP, global food prices have risen by 55% since last June. Consequently, the WFP faces a $500 million shortfall for its 2008 budget.


• 12 humanitarian personnel were killed.\textsuperscript{25}

The frequency of attacks against humanitarian targets increased during the first quarter of 2008. In the first four months of the year, 113 humanitarian vehicles were hijacked.\textsuperscript{26} In January, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said that attacks on aid workers were a “debilitating factor for humanitarian operations.”\textsuperscript{27} Nearly 90 aid workers were abducted in Darfur since the beginning of the year, according to the U.N. Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan.\textsuperscript{28} Forty-six humanitarian premises were also attacked, resulting in eight deaths and eight injuries.\textsuperscript{29}

Aid workers and U.N. personnel are increasingly traveling by air, further limiting already patchy access. Making matters worse, aid groups in Darfur can not speak freely about the humanitarian situation. According to a Reuters/AlertNet poll released in May 2007, four-fifths of individual workers and two-thirds of relief agencies were not free to talk about killings, rapes and abductions in Darfur. Some groups even refused to participate in the poll. “Speaking about touchy issues might result in restrictions and an order to leave the country which we do not want to risk, considering many people depend upon our support,” said an aid agency spokesperson on condition of anonymity.\textsuperscript{30} Aid workers that speak publicly are inevitably expelled from the country, as was the case in late August 2007 with the country director for CARE, one of the most active humanitarian groups in Darfur.

Political Developments

\textit{Justice and Equality Movement attacks the capital}

On the morning of May 10, roughly 3,000 Justice and Equality Movement rebels appeared on the outskirts of Omdurman, Khartoum’s twin city across the Nile. The Zaghawa-dominated rebel group travelled at night, largely unnoticed, from their stronghold in Darfur some 600 miles away. Heavy fighting was reported in and around the capital for days. Government forces halted the advancing rebels, but up to 1,000 rebels shed their military gear and dispersed among the civilians. The government responded by arresting hundreds of rebel sympathizers, but also ordinary Zaghawa around Khartoum and Omdurman. There are consistent reports of government torture of civilians. At least two extra-judicial killings in public by government forces and allied popular defense forces are confirmed, and dozens more remain unconfirmed.\textsuperscript{31} There are unconfirmed reports that a number of security services surrounded and sealed off the Souq Libya neighborhood of Omdurman, where large numbers of Darfuris live and work.

After the JEM attack, significant government troop movement was reported throughout Darfur. Troop movement is reported especially in North Darfur, where JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim is said to be hiding. Government forces attacked the Sudan Liberation Army/al-Nur faction stronghold of Jabal Eissa in North Darfur, despite indications that SLA commanders declined to join the JEM attack. JEM likely executed this campaign without assistance from any other rebel factions, possibly as a result of rebel divisions.

**Significance of fragmentation among rebels**

Rebel fragmentation significantly contributes to growing insecurity in Darfur. It is increasingly difficult to determine who is in command of a specific group of combatants at any given time.

Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations at the U.N. summed up the situation:

> The fighting in Darfur makes clear that preparing for political negotiations does not seem to be a priority for either the Government or rebel movements. The implications are dire. On the one hand, negotiations are required to bring this crisis to an end. But with the Government intent on military action and the rebels either fighting or fragmenting, it is difficult to see an opening for political negotiations. On the other hand, a peacekeeping operation alone cannot bring security to Darfur.

Further complicating matters, the Sudanese air force bombed locations where rebel leaders were due to unify their negotiating positions. Only a fraction of the rebel factions (between ten and 17, depending on the source) attended peace talks in Libya in October 2007. The absence of pivotal actors, insufficient preparation by mediators and minimal flexibility from Khartoum hurt the talks. The only consensus was that “more talks were necessary.” Since then, in large part due to facilitation by the rebel-group-cum-political-party Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, a number of factions agreed to present unified negotiating positions at any future talks.

**Resettlement**

Tens of thousands of non-Darfuris have arrived in Darfur since the beginning of 2007, many to settle on land belonging to displaced Darfuris. The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the Sudanese government’s Commissioner for Refugees reported that as many as 30,000 people have left Chad for Darfur in a steady flow since early 2007. They reported that most, though not all, are from nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes which self-identify as Arab. After assessment teams, commissioned by the two agencies, interviewed new arrivals who claimed they were fleeing violence and insecurity in Chad, UNHCR...
recommended that most new arrivals receive refugee status. 38 There have also been repeated allegations that 45,000 settlers from Niger crossed into Darfur.39

Some of the new arrivals report being instructed to settle on Darfuri land. The UNHCR/COR report on the 30,000 Chadian settlers specifically notes that “upon their arrival in Western Darfur, some families reported having been directed by local Sudanese tribesman or local Sudanese leaders to occupy empty land, especially in the Wadi Azoum and Wadi Saleh areas. The land, for the most part, belongs to people who are now displaced in camps throughout Darfur or eastern Chad.”40

Tribal and ethnic tensions in Darfur increased because Darfuris suspect that new arrivals plan to reside in Darfur permanently. Many Darfuris also believe that the Sudanese government is facilitating the resettlement. Rumors circulated that Chadian refugees were offered Sudanese identification cards. A U.N. official claimed that one hospital was asked to forge 100 birth certificates.41 Many Darfuris fear that the Sudanese government plans to permanently alter the ethnic composition of Darfur and in turn guarantee tens of thousands of additional votes for the ruling National Congress Party in the Sudanese national elections in 2009.42

**National census**

In April, the Sudanese government began a national census. The census is an integral part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended a two-decade long war between north and south Sudan. The census should have been completed last year, but was postponed multiple times due to logistic difficulties — not only in Darfur but also in the south, east and extreme north of the country — and government delays. Nearly two million southerners who fled their homes during the civil war remain displaced in the north and will not be counted in their home districts. Millions of Darfuris are in the same situation.

Mass displacements in Sudan will hurt the effort to establish an accurate count of Sudan’s ethnic and religious composition to facilitate upcoming elections. Additionally, census forms do not establish religious or tribal affiliation. Arabic-language materials are used in the largely non-Arabic speaking south. Darfuri rebels and their supporters are boycotting the census. Fighting in Darfur and the contested region of Abiyei threatens the ability to perform it. The government of south Sudan already declared that it will not be bound the results.43 Some observers fear that an imperfect census will further marginalize Darfuris and grant non-Sudanese new arrivals voting and property rights. In spite of all those legitimate concerns, the U.N. Secretary-General and the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Sudan welcome the long-awaited census.

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41 “Resettlement or Land Grab? ’Arabization’ Scheme is Feared in Darfur as Chadians Move In.” Los Angeles Times 12 August 2007.
On July 31, 2007, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1769. The resolution authorized a joint United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. UNAMID will be the largest United Nations peacekeeping force ever deployed, with more than 26,000 troops, police, and civilian personnel. UNAMID is authorized to support early and effective implementation of the practically defunct 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement and prevent disruption of its implementation. The force is also authorized to prevent armed attacks and protect civilians. UNAMID is also mandated to protect its own facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure security and freedom of movement of its personnel and of humanitarian workers.

As of March 10, only 9,178 uniformed personnel — roughly 35 percent of the total authorized force — were deployed. The group includes 7,441 military personnel, 1,597 police officers and one police unit. Only 1,312 civilians — less than 25 percent of the authorized civilian component of the force — were deployed as of that date. Another 3,600 troops from Egypt and Ethiopia are slated for deployment in May. If the U.N. fails to fully deploy UNAMID, it will be only the second time in history that its troops did not deploy after authorization by the Security Council. The first time was Resolution 1706, which authorized troops for Darfur in 2006.

UNAMID is estimated to cost $2.5 billion a year, in addition to start-up costs. U.N. member states will fund the mission through the U.N. assessment scale. The United States will contribute 27.1 percent of costs. Of the approximately 9,000 troops deployed, roughly 7,400 were transferred to UNAMID from the now-defunct African Union Mission in Sudan. The transition has not been smooth:

> [t]he force is...facing challenges in its transition from the AMIS to the UNAMID logistics supply system. Similarly, the mission is further hampered by ageing equipment inherited from AMIS. Until the process of AMIS asset liquidation is complete, communication equipment and vehicles transferred from AMIS cannot be processed for United Nations registration, licensing and maintenance. As a result, many of the computers, radios and vehicles used by former AMIS military and police personnel are incompatible with United Nations networks and standards.46

As detailed in the Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council on February 14, seven months after Resolution 1769 passed, Khartoum continues to obstruct deployment of UNAMID. The Sudanese government has not provided adequate land for bases. It explicitly refused units from Norway, Sweden and others that the U.N. deems critical to the success of the mission. The Sudanese government routinely delayed the release of equipment from Port Sudan, and it obstructed visas for contractors. Additionally, the government has not approved the list of troop contributing countries submitted by the U.N. on October 2, 2007. Such tactics are part of a long-standing and well-documented pattern to frustrate and inhibit the progress of UNAMID deployment. In his latest briefing to the U.N. Security Council on April 22, UNAMID chief Rodolphe Adada said that the obstacles faced by the

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understaffed and underequipped mission “have not reduced over the last three months,” and that personnel continue to serve “under exceptionally difficult conditions, facing daily dangers and hardships.”

Equally problematic is the reticence of U.N. member states to contribute the heavy equipment and airborne assets necessary for UNAMID. Member states, especially those with an expansive arsenal of equipment — NATO-members, Russia, China, and others — claim that they are militarily overstretched or that they already contributed more than their fair share. Even a cursory look at the number of uncommitted airborne assets of the United States, European Union states, Russia, the Ukraine and others reveals that the shortage is one of political will. The United States, Britain, and France are urging other nations to contribute the assets, instead of doing it themselves.

UNAMID needs three Medium Utility Helicopter Wings and one Light Tactical Helicopter Wing, totaling 18 transport and six tactical helicopters as well as associated operators and maintenance teams. The mission also needs heavy transport trucks. Considering the size of Darfur and the state of its infrastructure, it is a modest request. More than six months after authorization, the force only has a pledge for three to four tactical and up to two transport helicopters from Ethiopia. The U.N. reportedly turned down helicopter offers from Bangladesh and Jordan because they did not meet minimum standards for operating in Darfur. The helicopters did not have one or more of the required features: engine filters for sand, night-flight capabilities, or the minimum range necessary. Although Russia’s ambassador to the U.N. announced on March 4 that his country would supply helicopters to UNAMID manned by crews from other countries, no official offer was submitted to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

With every passing day, full UNAMID deployment becomes more urgent but also less likely. With merely a third of the total force deployed, only the most rudimentary equipment, only a few months left until UNAMID’s current authorization expires, and the impending rainy season from June-September, severely limiting mobility in an area that already suffers from some of the worst infrastructure in the world, time is rapidly running out. On March 5, U.S. special envoy to Sudan Richard Williamson said that a new group called Friends of UNAMID would meet at the U.N. that week to help arrange for training and equipment for peacekeepers in Darfur. The group includes representatives from the United States, Canada, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Tanzania, the European Union and the U.N. Department for Peacekeeping Operations.

New International Forces in Chad & the Central African Republic

48 “Darfur Peace Force Unlikely to be Operational Before Next Year,” Agence France Presse 22 April 2008.
53 Photographs depicting the extreme flooding during Darfur’s rainy season can be viewed at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/memphotoalbum/112548523085.htm.
54 Darfur, an area roughly the size of France, only has 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles) of roads. Only 20 percent of those are paved or graveled, the rest are rough dust roads.
On September 25, 2007, the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1778 establishing two new forces: the U.N. Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and the European Union-led EU Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR). It was the first time the Security Council authorized a U.N. force and a non-U.N. force with supplementary mandates.

Half of EUFOR’s 3,700-strong force is composed of French troops and the remainder comes from 18 other countries. The force is authorized for an initial term of one year and is authorized to take all necessary measures to protect civilians, U.N. personnel and to ensure safe passage for humanitarian aid. An additional reserve of 600 troops will be stationed in Europe. Of the total force strength, only 1,770 have been deployed so far, with an expected 175 additional troops arriving in eastern Chad in the coming weeks. The force commander described the deployment, despite delays, as “going smoothly.”

MINURCAT has an authorized strength of up to 350 police and military liaison officers and an equal number of civilian staff from a variety of U.N. member states. Its mandate is to train and otherwise support Chadian police tasked with protecting refugee camps in the eastern part of the country. Over 100 MINURCAT personnel are already deployed and more will join them as EUFOR begins to implement its mandate. EUFOR is tasked with creating the secure environment needed for MINURCAT to train and support Chadian police.

On March 4, a EUFOR vehicle strayed a few kilometers across the unmarked Chad-Darfur border. Sudanese government sources claimed that soldiers shot at a checkpoint five kilometers past the border and fled when Sudanese forces fired back. EUFOR’s forces suffered its only casualty so far when a soldier was found dead just inside the Sudanese border. Two Sudanese citizens were also killed in the skirmish, but it is not clear if they were civilians.

**New Government Offensives**

In a recent interview with the Sudanese newspaper *Al-Sahafa*, the Sudanese Defense Minister announced that he was not bound by any previously signed agreements and that “all areas where rebels are present will continue to be targets of the armed forces.”

Government forces launched a renewed offensive in February aimed at dislodging the JEM from its stronghold in the Jabal Moun area of West Darfur. According to local observers, preparations for the attack started months ago. On February 8, following an aerial assault by Antonov bombers and helicopter gunships, government forces attacked the towns of Sirba, Abu Surug and Silia, killing a large number of civilians. Witnesses in all three locations reported that Antonov transport planes that the Sudanese air force converted into bombers were painted white, a color reserved for humanitarian and medical aircrafts, in
clear violation of international humanitarian law. Shortly thereafter, Janjaweed looted and burned down large parts of the towns. In all, over one hundred civilians, including children and the elderly, were killed. Hundreds more were injured and close to 40,000 people were displaced. Over 10,000 of the displaced fled to refugee camps in Chad.65

Many of Silia’s over 10,000 displaced persons sought refuge in the town and IDP camp of Aro Sharro nearby. The air force, government forces and Janjaweed attacked them there, along with the original inhabitants in both the camp and town. Many of the 5,000 original refugees who lived in the camp, as well as residents of the town itself, fled following the first wave of attacks on Silia and the two other towns. Still, as many as 15 people were killed in the February 18th attacks, according to the JEM.66

Since rebels took control of the Jabal Moun area in late 2007, the government has denied humanitarian access to areas north of Seraf Jidad, cutting off 160,000 people from aid. On March 3, Ameerah Haq, the U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, said that JEM was denying an assessment mission access to Jabal Moun. The U.N. appealed to all parties to provide unfettered access to humanitarian workers. After nearly two weeks of relative stability and improved access, Sudanese government aircraft resumed air strikes in the Jebel Moun area. Roughly 20,000 additional civilians remain trapped in that area.69

Attacks on the North Darfur village of Shigeg Karo on May 4 illustrated the absence of a UNAMID rapid response capability. An Antonov bomber shelled the village, killing at least eleven civilians. Half of the casualties were children under eleven. The attack destroyed a school and one of only two water pumps in the village. Another 30 people were injured. It took over 48 hours for assistance and medical evacuation to arrive.70

In its current state, UNAMID can not protect civilians or its own assets. The force itself came under attack at least four times since its partial deployment on December 31, 2007. Force personnel did not return fire during any of those attacks. Once they were not even armed. The last time, four unidentified armed men hijacked two of three vehicles in a UNAMID convoy and stole personal belongings and identification cards. Each time UNAMID is attacked and does not return fire, it reinforces the perception that it cannot even protect itself, let alone the civilians in its care. Individuals not affiliated with the government, most likely common criminals, attacked UNAMID only after three government attacks without retaliation.71

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62 Ibid. There is a documented history of repeat violations of this kind by the Sudanese military. This is increasingly problematic, because a growing percentage of food deliveries are made via white Antonov transports. Civilians are frequently left to wonder whether they are about to receive much needed food or are about to get bombed.

63 “New Wave of Violence in Darfur,” Darfur Relief and Documentation Center 13 February 2008.

64 Ibid

65 Anette Rehrl, “UNHCR evacuates staff from Chad border after air strikes in Darfur,” Reuters 19 February 2008.


Chadian Rebels Push for N’Djamena

On February 2, about 4,000 Chadian rebels reached the Chadian capital N’Djamena as part of a swift offensive launched from Darfur. They entered Chad near Adé, south of al-Geneina in West Darfur. This was not the first time Chadian rebels supported by Khartoum tried to dislodge Chadian President Idriss Deby, an active supporter of Darfuri rebels. In April 2006, rebels nearly took the capital when French Mirage fighter jets helped Deby’s Republican Guard thwart them in an eleventh-hour effort. France said it would not get involved, but when Deby’s demise seemed all but certain, France offered to evacuate him. When Deby turned the offer down, France provided intelligence and logistical assets, though not direct military resources, under the cover of a Security Council resolution authorizing France to help repel the rebels.72 Similarly, the African Union said that they will not recognize an authority that comes to power by force in Chad.73

As these events were unfolding, Chadian Prime Minister Nouradin Koumkoye demanded that the international community find another home for Sudanese refugees in Chad.74 He even threatened that if “they cannot do it, we are going to do it.”75 Analysts viewed these statements as a maneuver to hasten the deployment of international forces. Foreign Minister Ahmad Allam-Mi made a more measured statement, saying that “the government does not want to deal with more refugees.”76 Regardless, Chad does not have the resources to move a quarter million refugees, or anywhere to move them to.

The Chadian government used two similar tactics to induce international pressure on Khartoum and elicit accelerated deployment of EUFOR. One was a short-lived refusal by unidentified gunmen presumed to be working for N’Djamena to allow refugees from Darfur to enter Chad. N’Djamena also delayed permission for UNHCR to load refugees onto trucks to refugee camps.

The Small Arms Survey, a highly regarded graduate institute at the University of Geneva, noted in its most recent briefing paper on Chad and its relationship to Darfur, that

Proxy forces supported by both N’Djamena and Khartoum are increasingly beyond the control of their masters, and pose serious risks to both. These militias are integrated into local ethnic and political conflicts, and limit the capacity of Chad, Sudan, or the international community to stabilize the region.77

It also concluded that

Threats by the main Chadian rebel groups against the deployment of peacekeepers, together with confusion over the peacekeeping mandate and

72 Scott Baldauf and Susan Sachs, “As fighting rages in Chad, France’s new role revealed,” The Christian Science Monitor 05 February 2008.
74 “Chad Threatens to Expel Darfur Refugees by Force,” Sudan Tribune 11 February 2008
75 Ibid
the roles and responsibilities of contributed troops, raise the likelihood of violence and insecurity, and places humanitarian operations in jeopardy.\textsuperscript{78}

**International Criminal Court**

On April 27, 2007, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Sudan’s Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs, Ahmad Harun, and *Janjaweed* leader Ali Abd al-Rahman, also known as Ali Kushayb. The two are accused of individual responsibility for 51 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including murder, forcible transfer of population, rape, persecution, torture, and outrages upon personal dignity, among others.

The Sudanese government refused to hand over either suspect. Sudan is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, the formal treaty that regulates the ICC. But it is obligated to surrender Harun and Kushayb because the case was referred to the court by the Security Council. Sudanese disdain for the court does not end there. The government announced during a visit to the country by the U.N. Secretary-General that Harun would co-chair a committee to adjudicate human rights violations in Darfur. Kushayb, who was in jail when the warrants were issued for unrelated charges, was released two weeks after Harun’s new appointment.

To further signal its contempt of the ICC, Khartoum appointed notorious *Janjaweed* leader Musa Hillal as special advisor on tribal affairs to the president. Hillal is already subject to a U.N.-mandated travel ban, and is considered to have been among the most egregious offenders in North Darfur in 2003, 2004 and beyond.\textsuperscript{79} The Security Council can institute punitive measures in response to Sudanese intransigence over the ICC, but it has not done so, largely because of Chinese and Russian veto threats.

**Working toward Multilateral Sanctions**

On May 29, 2007, in response to Khartoum’s persistent intransigence and noncompliance with regard to Darfur, the U.S. announced unilateral sanctions against Sudan.\textsuperscript{80} The “Plan B” sanctions, as they are commonly referred to, target 31 companies owned, controlled or affiliated with the Sudanese government. They also sanction Ahmad Harun, Awad Ibn Auf, director of Sudan’s Military Intelligence Office and JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim. Plan B was described by many economic and political observers alike as ineffectual. Time will tell if the sanctions help bring an end to the genocide in Darfur. Policy experts agree that multilateral sanctions would be more effective, but would require the cooperation of the European Union, as well as Sudan’s main economic partners, such as China, Malaysia, and India, who have so far been reluctant to sanction Khartoum. Many advocates and analysts have called for multilateral sanctions, but the political consensus is missing.

**Divestment**

The global movement to divest from Sudan continues to grow in the United States and internationally. Emulating the anti-apartheid divestment campaign of the 1980s, activists initiated divestment drives at the portfolio, university, city, provincial and national levels. In the U.S., 22 states adopted divestment policies and another 23 initiated similar action. Over 55 North American universities adopted Sudan divestment policies and there are 47 more active campaigns to do the same. Fifteen U.S. cities divested from Sudan. Australia,

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid


\textsuperscript{80} The United States has had trade and investment sanctions in place against Sudan since 1997, when it was harboring Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders.
Canada, Ireland, Italy, South Africa, Germany and the United Kingdom are at various stages of divestment campaigns.\footnote{The most up-to-date information on the global movement to divest from the Sudan is available at www.sudandivestment.org.}

On December 31, 2007, President George Bush signed the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act. The bill protects local bodies that divested from foreign companies whose business with Sudan fuels the genocide from litigation. It also prohibits federal contracts with foreign companies funding the genocide.\footnote{“Implementing the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act.” Genocide Intervention Network.}

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The Save Darfur Coalition – an alliance of more than 180 faith-based, advocacy and human rights organizations – raises public awareness about the ongoing genocide in Darfur and mobilizes a unified response to the atrocities that threaten the lives of people throughout the Darfur region. The coalition's member organizations represent 130 million people of all ages, races, religions and political affiliations united together to help the people of Darfur.