No dialogue, no commitment
The perils of deadline diplomacy for Darfur

On 5 May 2006 the Government of Sudan (GoS) and one rebel group, SLM-Minawi, signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). This ceasefire and peace agreement was the result of intense pressure from the international community and the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council on both the parties and the mediators in the hope of ending the killing and human rights violations in Darfur. Six previous rounds of talks and the agreements they produced had failed to accomplish this.

Yet it quickly became apparent that, like previous agreements, the DPA was doomed to fail. Using the Arab militia known as the Janjaweed as its proxy force, the GoS soon launched an offensive against non-signatory rebel groups and civilians, creating at least 50,000 new internally displaced persons (IDPs) and drastically reducing humanitarian access. The post-DPA period has also seen a dangerous splintering of the rebel movements, precipitating violence among various armed factions.

As part of the HSBA’s focus on armed groups and insecurity in Sudan, this Issue Brief examines the process that led to the DPA and the subsequent violence and insecurity, asking a number of key questions:

- How did the negotiations leading to the DPA fail?
- What role did the international community play in its failure?
- What led to the splintering of rebel groups and increased insecurity following the DPA?

This Issue Brief finds that there is little hope that the warring parties intend to observe the terms of the DPA. Crucially, the GoS has not moved to contain and disarm the Janjaweed as required under Article 417 of the DPA, which is a precondition for the rebels’ disarmament. Despite the disappointing results, the process and outcome of the peace talks offer important lessons for future attempts to bring peace and security to Darfur.

The context
In 2003 fighting erupted in the Darfur region of Sudan as rebel movements mobilized against the GoS’s political and economic marginalization of their communities. Media reports tend to portray the conflict as a struggle between African farmers and Arab herdsmen over land and water resources, but its root causes lie in Khartoum’s oppressive and exploitative relations with the peripheries of Sudan. The GoS and the Janjaweed responded to the rebellion with such an extensive destruction of people and villages that the US administration and others accused them of genocide. Fighters on both sides have targeted civilians as well as combatants. By 2006 up to 350,000 people had died from violence, starvation, and disease, and almost two million people had been displaced.

In 2004–05 six rounds of peace talks produced nothing more than a declaration of principles and a series of ceasefire accords that the parties proceeded to violate repeatedly. In November 2005 the seventh and final round of talks began in the Nigerian capital of Abuja under the auspices of an AU mediation team led by Salim Ahmed Salim, former Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, and supported by the UN, the UK, the United States, and other international partners. Their aim was to broker a comprehensive peace agreement between the GoS and the two main rebel movements in Darfur, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM). The SLM at the time was divided into two factions.

On 5 May 2006, the GoS and Minni Minawi, leader of one of the SLM factions, signed the DPA, but it was rejected by the JEM and Abdel Wahid al Nur, leader of the second SLM faction. Without the support of all parties there was little prospect for peace in Darfur.

Six previous rounds of talks and the agreements they produced had failed to end the killing and human rights violations in Darfur.
Deadlock in Abuja

In Abuja the Sudanese parties were unwilling to engage in negotiations. At plenary meetings and working sessions they merely reiterated demands, traded accusations, and endeavoured to sway the mediators. No attempt was made to find common ground. There was no bargaining, let alone collaborative problem-solving.

There were four reasons for the absence of negotiations. First, the parties viewed each other with intense hatred, suspicion, and contempt. This is a characteristic of all deadly conflicts, and a key function of mediation is to build the parties’ confidence in each other and in the process of negotiation. In Abuja, there was no thawing of enmity or suspicion.

Second, the rebels were sorely divided. There was significant disagreement and mistrust between the SLM and JEM. The two SLM factions—themselves tenuous alliances of local leaders—were attacking each other in Darfur. These divisions made it difficult for the rebels to agree collectively on anything but a hard-line position.

Thirdly, the power asymmetry between the rebels and Khartoum reinforced intransigence on all sides. Compared with the GoS, the rebels were militarily weak and inexperienced at negotiation. They were consequently frightened of being outwitted in the negotiations. They were consequently frightened of being outwitted in the at negotiation. They were consequently militarily weak and inexperienced. Compared with the GoS, the rebels were militarily weak and inexperienced.

Fourthly, most of the parties in Abuja viewed the battlefield as the strategic arena of conflict and the negotiations merely as a tactical arena. Minawi was engaged in a war of manoeuvre against Abdel Wahid; Khartoum believed it would win a war of attrition against the fragmented rebel movements; and JEM had a national political agenda that would not be satisfied by a peace agreement for Darfur.

In short, not one of the parties was willing to meet the essential requirements for successful negotiations in a civil war, namely cooperation with the enemy, reciprocal concessions, and the mutual accommodation of one another’s needs and interests.

International pressure

Frustrated with the negotiating parties’ lack of progress as the killing continued unabated in Darfur, the AU and its international partners issued one monthly deadline after another for the conclusion of an agreement. But the deadlines came and went without any repercussions, resulting in no real pressure on the parties.

In March 2006 the AU Peace and Security Council called for a comprehensive agreement by 30 April, a date endorsed by the UN Security Council as the final deadline. On 25 April, the mediation team presented the DPA to the parties on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis. The parties were given less than a week to understand, debate, and endorse an 86-page, English-language document describing complicated security, political, economic, and administrative arrangements.

The ultimatum was manifestly unreasonable and impractical. The parties disagreed profoundly on most of the critical issues covered by the DPA; the document confronted them with mechanisms and arrangements they had not previously considered; the rebels had no time to consult their members and constituencies in Darfur; and many had difficulty understanding very complex documents. Exacerbating these difficulties, the DPA was not made available in Arabic, the language of choice for most of the rebel negotiators, until 28 April—two days before the deadline.

When the rebels’ request for an additional three weeks to digest and comment on the document was declined, they rejected the DPA. In objecting to the unrealistic deadline, they also complained that the document favoured the GoS and did not adequately address the political, economic, and security rights of Darfurians. The GoS, on the other hand, stated that it was prepared to endorse the DPA despite its reservations.

Salim extended the deadline by 48 hours and then a further 48 hours. In this brief period there was a frenzy of behind-the-scenes deals, offers, and threats as Nigeria’s President Olusegun Obasanjo, US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, and the British Secretary of State for International Development, Hilary Benn, endeavoured to stave off collapse.

Minawi came under particular pressure because he had the largest fighting force in Darfur. He was warned that his failure to sign the DPA might lead to his name being added to the list of Sudanese individuals on whom the UN Security Council had imposed sanctions.8 He relented at the last moment. On 5 May Minawi and the GoS’s chief negotiator signed the DPA.

Abdel Wahid beseched the mediators to help him resolve his outstanding concerns, which included compensation for victims of violence; SLM monitoring of Janjaweed disarmament; a role in the protection of returning refugees; and greater representation for the rebels in state assemblies. But the AU and its partners were adamant that the DPA was not open for renegotiation after it had been approved by the GoS and Minawi.

At the conclusion of the Abuja talks, as with the preceding deadline diplomacy, the AU and its partners lost sight
of the distinction between getting the parties to sign an agreement and obtaining their genuine commitment to its terms and implementation. The importance of this distinction was already manifest: previous talks had produced ceasefire accords that the parties had signed and then brazenly breached. So it was with the DPA. Following its approval the GoS and Minawi repeatedly contravened its security provisions.

The manipulation and threats of the international partners undermined the AU’s authority in the eyes of the parties, compromised Minawi, and created suspicion of the DPA in Darfur. In the final analysis, a peace agreement that did not include Abdel Wahid, whose faction represented the Fur—the largest ethnic group in Darfur—and the majority of IDPs, was never likely to achieve its goals.

**Pressure on the mediators**

For all their concern about the violence in Darfur, the international partners did not provide guaranteed funding for the peace talks. Instead, a small number of donors provided grants retroactively to cover past expenses but warned repeatedly that funding would dry up in the absence of a ‘quick accord’. Whereas the parties ignored the funding pressure and deadline diplomacy, the mediators were obliged to adhere to the monthly targets set by their donors and political principals. This had negative consequences for the process.

First, the looming deadlines made it pointless to develop a comprehensive mediation strategy and plan. Since the talks were always due to end in a matter of weeks, there was little call for a six-month plan. The deadlines inhibited a programmatic effort to build momentum gradually over time, leading instead to an ad hoc process that proceeded in fits and starts.

In fact, the deadline diplomacy was the strategy, but it was too simplistic and rigid for the purpose. The conflict in Darfur required a multi-faceted plan with objectives and strategies not only in relation to the parties in Abuja, but also to Sudan’s neighbouring states, the people of Darfur, AU and UN headquarters, key AU member states, and the power bases that comprise the ruling coalition in Sudan.

Second, the tight deadlines made it impossible for the mediators to communicate with the people of Darfur and important groups that were not represented at the talks. Similarly, the rebel negotiators were unable to properly brief and consult with their constituencies. Darfuri civil society had no opportunity to shape the DPA or acquire any sense of ownership of it.

Thirdly, the haste induced by the deadline diplomacy precluded effective mediation. The mediator’s job is to help disputant parties overcome mutual enmity and mistrust, build confidence in negotiations, and facilitate dialogue, bargaining, and collaborative problem-solving. This requires protracted effort and immense patience. It cannot be accomplished through an ad hoc approach and externally imposed short-term deadlines.

Instead of mediation, the deadline diplomacy led to a mediator-produced agreement covering cardinal issues on which the parties still bitterly disagreed; to an unreasonably brief period for the parties to consider and approve the document; and to a fierce burst of pressure in the dying moments of the negotiation process. Each of these elements was antithetical to the parties’ ownership of the DPA. In the final analysis, the mediators, rather than the parties, owned the DPA.

**Post-DPA responses**

Immediately after the signing ceremony in Abuja, thousands of people in Darfur demonstrated against the DPA. In June Jan Pronk, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in

---

**Box 1 Important security and disarmament provisions of the DPA**

The DPA includes detailed provisions for a comprehensive ceasefire and a no-fly zone over Darfur (art. 26). The provisions of the DPA creating demilitarized zones around IDP camps and humanitarian supply routes (arts. 282–86), and to establishing buffer zones where no forces, armed groups, or militia are present (art. 329). These requirements are to be monitored and overseen by the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which is also responsible for the ceasefire commissions. The signatory parties are represented on these commissions, whose functions include oversight, verification, and dispute resolution (arts. 22–26).

Following the cessation of hostilities, the DPA calls for a three-phase process in which GoS and rebel forces disengage, redeploy to agreed positions, and take ‘limited’ measures to secure arms (art. 290). This involves the parties placing long-range weapons systems, heavy artillery, crew-assisted weapons, and related ammunition in designated secure locations, subject to inspection by AMIS (art. 370). The phases, to be supervised and verified by AMIS, are intended to protect civilians, build confidence among the parties, and make offensive military action increasingly difficult to mount. In this context the DPA deals with the GoS’s duty to contain and disarm the Janjaweed (arts. 314, 315, and 367). This is a priority and pivotal component of the plan for two reasons: first, the GoS’s obligation to disarm the Janjaweed was mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1556 of 2004; second, in terms of the DPA, the rebels are not expected to redeploy their fighters until AMIS has verified that the GoS has met this obligation (art. 417).

After the disengagement, redeployment, and arms control phases, a set of activities relating to the ‘final status of forces’ is set to take place. These activities include the assembly of the rebel forces; their disarmament; the integration of specified numbers of combatants into the armed forces, police, and other security services of the state; the demobilization and reintegration of the remaining combatants; and the transformation of the official security services in Darfur (arts. 27 and 424–30). Overseeing all of this would be a Darfur Security Arrangements Commission, the head of which would be appointed by the rebel movements.

---
Sudan, warned that the accord was paralysed and might collapse. In his assessment it was a good text but did not resonate with the people of Darfur, meeting particular resistance from the IDPs, who felt it had been forced on them and only benefited Khartoum and Minawi’s minority tribe, the Zaghawa.

In July the GoS and Minawi, now appointed special adviser to the president under the DPA’s power-sharing provisions, formed an offensive military alliance that proceeded to attack communities that supported Abdel Wahid.

There was strong opposition to the deal within the Minawi group, with some commanders announcing the DPA’s suspension. Conversely, four dissenting officials from JEM and the Abdel Wahid faction signed a declaration of support for the DPA. No sooner had the SLM leaders left Abuja than the organization, already divided into two factions, began to splinter into different blocs (see Box 2). Dissenters from Abdel Wahid’s group set themselves up in Northern Darfur under the name SLM-Unity. Thirty commanders led by Ahmed Abdel Shafi Bassey then announced the ouster of Abdel Wahid, further splitting the movement. In an attempt to unify the non-signatories, JEM established the National Redemption Front (NRF) with support from Eritrea and Chad. The NRF is now the principal rebel force in Darfur.

In September 2006 the GoS mounted the first of three major post-DPA offensives aimed at crushing the rebellion. It bombed villages, attacked them with helicopter gunships, and terrorized IDP camps, killing many non-combatants. Far from being disarmed as required by the DPA and previous agreements, the Janjaweed were rearmed and redeployed by Khartoum. In December they clashed with rebels from Minawi’s faction in the city of Al Fasher in North Darfur. Minawi threatened to abandon the government and resume fighting if the Janjaweed were not disarmed.

The number of people in need of emergency aid has risen from one million in 2004 to four million. Yet

Box 2 Darfuri armed rebel groups

Rebel groups in the Darfur conflict are in constant flux—and there is often a lack of consensus on the origins, leaders, and even names of particular groups. As of November 2006, the ones listed below had been identified. They are divided into their two parent groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement.

**Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) factions and splinter groups**

**Abdel Shafi faction.** Fur-led faction chaired since July 2006 by Ahmad Abdel Shafi Bassey, one of the earliest founders of the rebel movement and its most strategic thinker. The faction rejects the DPA and seeks more political power at the regional level, stronger guarantees for Janjaweed disarmament, and better compensation for victims.

**Abdel Wahid faction.** Fur-led faction led by former chairman Abdel Wahid al Nur, who was deposed by field commanders in July 2006 in favour of Abdel Shafi, one of his earliest collaborators. Abdel Shafi is endeavouring to mend fences with Abdul Wahid, who retains strong support and name recognition among Darfurians.

**Minni Minawi faction.** Zaghawa faction led by Minni Minawi, currently part of the Government of National Unity. Desertions among Minawi’s commanders have picked up since he signed the DPA; he has reportedly been given an ultimatum to break with the GoS or lose his field support.

**SLM-Unity.** A North Darfur-based faction previously drawn from the so-called Group of 19, including commanders who cooperated with Abdul Wahid’s faction until the final stages of the Abuja peace process when they came to fear (wrongly) that the SLM chairman was going to ‘sell out’ to the government. SLM-Unity has inflicted serious reverses on the Sudanese army in recent months and attracted commanders from other factions. Despite a broad tribal base and considerable popular support, it has an uneasy relationship with the NRF, the Asmara-based, anti-DPA alliance launched by JEM with support from Chad (see below).

**Free Will (I).** Composed largely of ethnic Birgid members of the SLM in South Darfur, alienated by the abusive behaviour of Minni Minawi’s faction. Its leader, Commander Adam Salih, split from Minawi before the Haskanita conference in November 2005. Fighting between Free Will I and SLM-Minawi in October 2006 took dozens of lives. Free Will I has signed a political and military protocol with the JEM Peace Wing (see below) and supports the DPA.

**Free Will (II).** Headed by Abdel Rahman Musa, a Tunjur academic who was Abdul Wahid’s chief negotiator in Abuja. Abdul Rahman has signed a declaration of commitment to the DPA.

**The National Movement for the Elimination of Marginalization.** This is not a distinct group but an alias used by the SLM when conducting attacks on economic targets. It was headed by Ali Abdul Rahim, an Arab killed in a car crash in February 2005. Many blame his death on Minawi.

**Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) factions and splinter groups**

**Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).** Led by Khalil Ibrahim and former middle-ranking colleagues in the National Islamic Front. Equal parts tribal—Zaghawa/Kobe—and Islamist in outlook, JEM opposes the DPA.

**National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD).** The first JEM splinter group formed in April 2004 by JEM’s chief of staff, Colonel Jibril Abdul Karim ‘Tek’, a former member of Chadian President Idriss Deby’s presidential guard. It is dominated by the small Kapka clan of the Zaghawa tribe.

**The Field Revolutionary Command (FRC).** The second JEM splinter was formed early in 2005 by Mohamed Saleh, JEM’s chief representative on the Joint Ceasefire Commission in N’Djamena. FRC merged with the NMRD in late 2005.

**JEM Peace Wing.** A post-Abuja splinter that supports the DPA.

**National Redemption Front (NRF).** Established as an anti-DPA bloc in June 2006 by Khalil Ibrahim, together with veteran Darfuri opposition leaders and breakaway SLM commanders. Based in Asmara, NRF was created with support from Eritrea and Chad and enjoys a military alliance with SLM-Unity. The NRF has engaged in a series of armed offensive actions in the post-DPA period, defeating Sudanese army forces on a number of occasions. It is now the primary rebel army in Darfur.

Source: Small Arms Survey (2006)
the GoS and rebel groups consistently harass and obstruct the international humanitarian agencies in Darfur. This and the Janjaweed attacks have led many agencies to withdraw or curtail operations, severely limiting their access to desperate communities. The Darfur conflict also continues to destabilize neighbouring Chad, with both Sudanese and Chadian governments supporting each other’s insurgent movements to the grave detriment of civilians. 17

In the midst of the violence, AMIS has been largely ineffectual. Its 7,000 troops are unable to cover an area the size of France; its vehicles, equipment, and logistics are inadequate; and its troops have recently gone unpaid. AMIS has been shamefully neglected, not only by developed countries that could have alleviated these problems but also by African states and the AU. The AU’s DPA implementation team in Khartoum has only three senior professionals and struggles to get political direction from headquarters, and AMIS has so few political staff that they are sometimes absent from DPA meetings with the Government and Minawi.

The AU has failed to manage properly the ceasefire bodies established under the N’Djamena accord of 2004. The DPA strengthens these bodies by giving greater authority to their AU chairpersons. After the signing of the Agreement, however, the AU agreed to remove representatives of JEM and Abdel Wahid’s SLM from the ceasefire commissions, significantly weakening them as institutions, pushing non-signatories to the DPA further out of reach, and heightening perceptions in Darfur that the AU was biased.

The neglect of AMIS partly resulted from the expectation that it would be replaced by a UN force, as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1706 of August 2006. But the GoS vociferously objected to a UN deployment, gaining sympathy in some quarters by drawing an analogy with the US-led occupation of Iraq. It is willing to accept technical, advisory, and financial support from the UN, but has rejected a UN force or joint AU/UN force. 18 On this issue—as on others—Khartoum

---

The GoS and rebel groups consistently harass and obstruct international humanitarian agencies in Darfur.
has prevailed, its brinkmanship more skilled and its resolve much greater than the divided and weak-willed international community. In November the AU extended the AMIS mandate to June 2007.19

Picking up the pieces?

At the time of writing there was little prospect of resuscitating the DPA or deploying a UN force to protect civilians in Darfur. With the belligerents bent on continuing hostilities, the AU under-resourced and poorly focused, and the international community divided,20 the future looks grim.

Nevertheless, there is no viable alternative to a negotiated settlement among the parties to the conflict. AU mediators should maintain continuous dialogue with them and heed the lessons of Abuja. It should avoid artificial deadlines; play a facilitative rather than a prescriptive role; and encourage maximum inclusivity. There should be no insistence that the DPA is non-negotiable. Given the accord’s lack of credibility in Darfur, that route is a cul-de-sac that provides no incentive for the non-signatories to participate in talks.

In addition, the AU must ensure that the ceasefire commissions function properly. The DPA spells out the ways in which this should be done. AMIS should continue to monitor ceasefire violations and prepare reports on them. These reports should be discussed at the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council, and be used to put public and diplomatic pressure on offenders.

The UN, the major powers, the AU, and African states should provide AMIS with the resources and support it needs to fulfil its functions, particularly in relation to creating and maintaining demilitarized zones around humanitarian supply routes and IDP camps.

The desirability of a UN force should no longer serve as an excuse to avoid strengthening the African peacekeeping contingent.

AU member states should also put greater pressure on Khartoum to end its violence, disarm the Janjaweed, and be receptive to genuine negotiations. A united and committed African front, forthright and willing to employ a calibrated series of punitive measures, is probably the only strategy that can shift the GoS’s calculations in the direction of peace. ■

Notes

This Sudan Issue Brief was authored by Laurie Nathan, Research Fellow with the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics and the Department of Environmental and Geographical Sciences at the University of Cape Town. He was a member of the AU Mediation Team for Darfur during the Abuja peace talks.

1. The term janjaweed has historically been used in Darfur to refer to gunmen, bandits, or outlaws. It seems to be an amalgamation of the three Arabic words for ghost, horse, and gun. Since the 2003 crisis, the term refers to the Khartoum-backed nomadic Arab militias with significant recruitment from the Abbala Rezeigat group. They have been accused of carrying out most of the atrocities in Darfur. See ICG (2004).


3. This pattern of relations has generated rebellions in the south, east, and west of Sudan. On the origins, causes, and dynamics of the Darfur rebellion, see Flint and de Waal (2006).

4. See, for example, ‘Powell Calls Sudan Killings Genocide,’ CNN, 9 September 2004.


6. UNHCR (2006). For information on the debate surrounding the number of dead in Darfur, see USGAO (2006a).


8. For the list of individuals targeted for sanctions, see <http://usinfo.state.gov/af/Archive/2006/Apr/27-834323.html>.


10. For further details on the Abuja process, see Nathan (2006).


16. On this statement and the following, see USGAO (2006b).

17. See the reports of Human Rights Watch at <http://hrw.org/doc/?t=africa&c=chad>.

18. Khartoum distinguishes between a hybrid AU/UN operation and a hybrid or joint AU/UN force. See Reeves (2006).


20. Russia and China have consistently blocked punitive action by the UN Security Council.

Bibliography


Notes & References

See, for example, ‘Powell Calls Sudan Killings Genocide,’ CNN, 9 September 2004.

The project also generates a series of snapshots of baseline data. Future issues will focus on Other Armed Groups, the trade and transfer of small arms into and out of Sudan, local security arrangements, and victimization rates. The project also generates a series of timely and user-friendly working papers in English and Arabic, available at www.smallarmssurvey.org.

HSBA project summary

The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) is a two-year research programme (2005–07) administered by the Small Arms Survey, an independent research project of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

It has been developed in cooperation with the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UNMIS, the UN Development Programme, and a wide array of international and Sudanese NGO partners. Through the active generation and dissemination of timely empirical research, the HSBA project works to support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programmes, security sector reform (SSR), and arms control interventions to promote security. The assessment is being carried out by a multi-disciplinary team of regional, security, and public health specialists. It will review the spatial distribution of armed violence throughout Sudan and offer policy-relevant advice to redress insecurity.

Sudan Issue Briefs are designed to provide periodic snapshots of baseline data. Future issues will focus on Other Armed Groups, the trade and transfer of small arms into and out of Sudan, local security arrangements, and victimization rates. The project also generates a series of timely and user-friendly working papers in English and Arabic, available at www.smallarmssurvey.org.

The HSBA project is supported by Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and the UK Department for International Development.

Credits

Design and layout: Richard Jones (rmjones@onetel.com)
Cartography: Jillie Luff, MAPgrafi x

Contact details

For more information or to provide feedback, contact Claire Mc Evoy, HSBA project coordinator, at mcevoy@hei.unige.ch.

Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment
Small Arms Survey
47 Avenue Blanc
1202 Geneva
Switzerland
Tel.: +41 22 908 5777
Fax: +41 22 732 2738
Visit www.smallarmsssurvey.org (click on Sudan)