The key principle that should inform future peacekeeping doctrine development should be that the devolution of ‘the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to regional and sub-regional organisations does not represent a panacea for the difficult problems facing peacekeeping’.

Kofi Annan, 1998

Introduction

In military operations, including peacekeeping, the introduction of a new (military) doctrine is often accompanied by a myriad of challenges whose impact on the conduct and the end state of operations is not easy to predict. The development of the concept of the mechanism for using regional and other international forces, in conjunction with the UN, for intervention in violent armed conflicts in Africa and elsewhere has not escaped this phenomenon. Particularly in Africa, the conflict in Darfur has served to underscore the delicate implications and challenges inherent in the development and evolution of a concept such as this.

In Darfur, the deployment of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004, on the strength of the mandate of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), was initially hailed as part of the new African renaissance vision of not being indifferent to the causes and impact of devastating conflicts. The deployment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in the same year demonstrated the will of the AU to build upon peace implementation efforts undertaken by regional economic communities (RECs), notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It also offered an opportunity to test the ‘experiment’ of the concept of the African Standby Force (ASF) with regard to complex, multidimensional peacekeeping. The boldness of the AU initiatives stands in sharp contrast with the timid interventions of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), a body that had collectively managed the continent’s affairs since 1963.

AMIS has had to deal with unprecedented challenges to the implementation of peace in Darfur, throughout its operation, largely as a result of the lack of a binding ceasefire, the weakness associated with the AMIS mandate, and difficulties associated with force generation. The problems were compounded by insufficient logistical and other support and assistance. These dilemmas have effectively caused the evaporation of the optimism in the wake of the deployment of the mission. As a result, the UN and the international community have had to insist on the transfer of the peacekeeping mandate that increasingly appears to be neither achievable nor able to be abandoned, to a hybrid AU/UN operation. However, the projected deployment of the hybrid operation has been fraught with command and control challenges from the start. These mostly have their antecedents in the co-deployment operations with UN and ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troops in West Africa in the 1990s, as well as the OAU’s deployment in Ethiopia-Eritrea from 2000, and that of the AU in the troubled Great Lakes country of Burundi in 2004.

Admittedly, such difficulties are not new and have plagued relationships between the UN and its member states for decades, as acknowledged by the UN (UN 2006:3): ‘Authority and Command and Control over diverse components within a multidimensional Peacekeeping Operation continue to create challenges for mission planners and managers at both UN Headquarters (strategic) and mission (operational) levels.’

In the particular instance of Darfur, the tensions over strategic authority, command and control of the hybrid operation are between two organisations that worked together on a similar mechanism in Africa before. What is new this time is that they have to do so in a
non-permissive state, Sudan, which is politically and economically fairly stable and is strongly opposed to and continues to express reservations about the hybrid deployment. Therefore the fact that the government of Sudan agreed to such a deployment after the visit of Security Council members in June 2007 is to be viewed with some scepticism. In addition, this points to the fact that the recommendations by the Brahimi Panel in 2000 may not have been wholly comprehensive (Durch et al 2003; Eide et al 2005).

In this discourse, the author provides examples of interventions in various conflicts in which similar multi-institutional forces were used and highlights some of the key characteristics that explain why hybrid operations were relatively successful in these interventions. He makes the point that AMIS is encountering difficulties in its metamorphosis into a hybrid operation as a result of a fundamental problem: a quick-fix approach at the political level that tends to gloss over the prerequisites for the application of the concept against the political milieu of Sudan. It particularly examines the challenges of the hybrid command and control arrangements. In the context of the wider imperatives of the post-Cold War era, it submits that peacekeeping doctrine suffers from policy anaemia and no longer fits with the realities of the present-day world, and especially globalisation, and against the background of the competing ends of unilateralism and regionalisation.

First, the paper gives a broad overview of the concept of co-deployment, a precursor of hybrid operations, using the examples of deployments in West Africa in the 1990s and Burundi in 2004-2005, as well as the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea since 2000, in the Horn of Africa. This is followed by a critical review of the hybrid operation in Darfur. These analyses, in which the need for a common definition of the concept and the mechanism is asserted, lead the author to argue that the ‘hybrid’ concept is in practice a political construct of conventional joint multinational operations. The difficulties confronting the so-called hybrid AU-UN operation is in part precisely the result of endeavours to present it as something other than joint multinational operations for the sake of political expediency.

The author submits that it would be advisable to avoid using the term to describe the projected operation, but rather emphasise closer coordination and integration of resources and efforts to attain clearly defined end states and exit strategies. In the meantime, there is need for a common definition and understanding of the nature of hybrid operations which all stakeholders and players can apply.

Towards a common definition: A doctrinal note on ‘hybrid operations’

A problematic aspect of many emerging doctrines, operational concepts or typologies is the pervasive assumption that the terms mean the same thing to all stakeholders and in all situations. In the first place, not all operations undertaken by different organisations with a common objective in the same theatre can be classified as hybrid operations. Furthermore, the definition of a hybrid operation should not be based on a dictionary definition of the word, but on its diagnostic and experiential features. In reality, the lack of a common, acceptable definition and understanding of what a hybrid operation is could be partly responsible for the impasse over the hybrid operation in Darfur.

The Darfur Integrated Task Force (AU DITF nd:3) offered the following definition of hybrid operations: ‘A combined [joint] operation in a particular area of responsibility conducted by … forces from different organisations under a common command and control arrangement, for the purpose of achieving a common objective or end state, with each force retaining its organisation’s identity throughout the operation.’

The question is whether this is the prevailing notion of hybrid operations, or whether a new definition is being sought that addresses the exigencies of the Darfur conflict. A common definition for all hybrid operations should take into account the political element and other operational aspects, particularly the authority for the mandate, the strategic as well as operational command and control arrangements, and the generation and composition of forces. Based on these considerations, the suggestion in this paper, without being oblivious of the debate that it could instigate, is that a generic definition of hybrid operations could be as follows:

- A joint multinational and/or multidisciplinary operation in a specific area of operational responsibility
- Conducted by forces from different organisations and/or states, each with its own mandate (objectives, missions, tasks, end states, composition, etc)
- Under different Status of Forces or Missions Agreements (SOFAs) and host nation agreements
- With different rules of engagements
- Each under the command and control of its respective mandating authority
- Each retaining its organisation’s identity throughout the operation
- Each undertaking different functional missions and tasks
- But with provision for the coordination of operations, including combat, combat support, combat service support, air support and transport, within that area of operational responsibility
- For the purpose of achieving objectives or end states that may be common or whose achievement will contribute to the management and resolution of the conflict from different political-military perspectives
The above working definition, based on the diagnostic features of previous hybrid operations, varies slightly from the UN’s general understanding of the Darfur hybrid operation. Regardless of whether the definition gains general acceptance, it does not detract from the need for a common definition of hybrid operations to facilitate a degree of baseline understanding of the issues involved in the Darfur operation.

As Shepard Forman (2007) puts it:

These diverse deployments have led to a broad sub-category generally dubbed ‘hybrid operations’, most notably the UN, NATO, EU’s support to the African Union in Sudan, the EU’s deployment within and alongside UNIFIL in Lebanon, and the EU’s and UN’s coordinated effort in the DRC. But these still-to-be understood hybrid operations also extend to complex relations between coalitions of the willing and the UN, as in the Australian-led force in Timor-Leste, or the relationship between coalition and NATO forces and the UN mission in Afghanistan. While theoretically offering complementary capacities in field operations, the very ‘hybrid’ nature of these operations raises important questions regarding command and control, coherence and coordination, and the legitimating role of the UN.

In the current discourse about the Darfur hybrid operation, the definition or interpretative aspects of that concept of the mechanism have also come to the fore. For instance, in their study entitled Evolving models of peacekeeping, policy implications and responses, Jones and Cherif (nd) seems to have assumed that the doctrine of co-deployment and the concept of hybrid operations are the same, at least this is the understanding from the common list they provided. In this paper, however, a distinction is made between the two, with the most defining difference being that co-deployment has thus far been limited to the UN and regional organisations whereas hybrid operations concern the involvement of framework or lead nation states and coalitions, with resultant more complex command and control arrangements.

Jones and Cherif have nevertheless provided a useful diagnostic tool for classifying different types of operations, based firstly on the mode of operation (that is, integrated, coordinated, parallel or sequential) and secondly on functional features (that is, short-term military support, civil-military division of labour, linked peacekeeping-observer, handover and integrated hybrid operations).

Both in terms of the definition and reality, what the Darfur operation seems to be presenting is the evolution of a concept of deployment and operations which entails the use of two forces (UN and AU) grouped or mixed in a way that could be fraught with immense doctrinal and operational problems. How plausible this will be, and what exact challenges it will entail, cannot be foreseen at this stage. However, an overview of similar deployments in the past could provide a sense of aspects and issues that may arise.

Co-deployment: An overview

The concept of co-deployment was initially defined by the UN (1999:10) simply as the deployment of UN field missions in conjunction with regional forces, with the deployments in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Georgia and Tajikistan cited as practical examples. The most complex of such co-deployments was in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the UN, as well as its Agency, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), NATO, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU all deployed missions under the overall coordination of the office of the high representative. Given the different mandating authorities, the respective components of the mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina were responsible for the following:

- Monitoring of the local police, amongst others, by the International Police Task Force (IPTF) of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)
- Maintenance of a safe and secure environment by NATO’s International Stabilisation Force (IFOR-SFOR)
- Supervision of and assistance with the organisation of elections by the OSCE
- Provision of traditional care for refugees by the UNHCR
- Support towards development assistance by the EU

However, the paucity of the definition and the examples cited give no indication of the dynamic factors that underpinned the functioning of these deployments in practice. One such factor is that co-deployed forces do not all have to be the same type and that they essentially undertake different specified functions that contribute to the common end state of restoring a country to sustainable peace and stability within the terms of their mandates, after conflict. The operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina had the added dimension that it involved considerable civil-military coordination (UN 2002, paragraphs 7-8) with third-party international actors, to make it possible to accomplish the different mandates and attain the ultimate goal.

In 1999, the UN started to differentiate between joint (multinational) operations (UN 1999:10) and co-deployment, citing the operations undertaken by the UN and the Organisation of American States (OAS) within the framework of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) as an example of the former.
In this operation, the cooperating organisations shared the responsibility for staffing, direction and financing.

In addition to differences in the objectives of the various types of deployment, the main defining element is in the degree of independent authority, command and control that the cooperating organisations exercise over their respective forces and components. While co-deployment involves the delineation of functional roles and tasks, based on the competencies of the cooperating organisations, in the same or designated geographical sectors, joint operations involve a greater degree of mixing and sharing of resources and responsibilities, within common geographical sectors designated for deployed forces under national command. Joint operations are based on the assumption that some of the functions and tasks involve mixed elements.

The two main types that emerged by the end of the 1990s, namely co-deployment and joint (multinational) operations, differed in terms of their particular command and control arrangements. In the case of co-deployment there was a separate strategic authority, as well as command and control, while in the case of joint operations there was a greater degree of integration of operational command and control resources. These two types can be considered as the precursors of hybrid operations, as is being proposed for Darfur.

**UN co-deployments in West African conflicts**

In West Africa, the convergence of regional and external policy positions found resonance and was reinforced by other factors in ensuring classic deployments of ECOMOG in the Mano River Union conflicts in Liberia (1990-1997 and 2003), in Sierra Leone (1991-1999) and in Côte d’Ivoire (2003). As indicated in figure 1, these exemplified the doctrine of co-deployment as defined by the UN:

From figure 1 it is clear that in all three countries the UN initially co-deployed smaller (observer) missions. This could be interpreted as a reflection of abdication from, or minimalist peacekeeping interventions in the aftermath of the debacle of the UN Operation in Somalia II (1993) and the Rwandan genocide (1994). Such UN deployments lacked credibility not only because of their small sizes, but also their limited mandates. UNOMIL tended to abandon the mission during tense moments and to seek a safe haven in Guinea (Conakry). In the case of UNOMIL tensions arose over the interpretation of the mission’s mandate to supervise the operation of ECOMOG. The UN accordingly had to augment its meagre presence in Liberia by co-deploying the expanded ECOMOG.

The success of the co-deployment operations in the above instances was largely due to the credibility of the commitment of the lead nation

This lasted only a short period, however, in spite of its ‘expanded’ categorisation and being comparatively better resourced than the regional ECOMOG. In reality, the termination of the experiment owed precisely to tensions in the co-habitation of missions separately mandated by different authorities, but having to work together under different (UN and regional) command and control arrangements.

Partly as a result of lessons learned from co-deployment, and partly as a result of a new political environment within West Africa, ECOWAS was only able to mobilise a smaller force and for a period of a few months (August-September) before transferring ECOMIL’s mandate to the UNMIL, which then subsumed the regional mission. During the transitional period, the hybrid UNMIL headquarters was made up of ECOMIL, the DPKO and a headquarters element of the Copenhagen-based Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). Earlier in May 2003, in Côte d’Ivoire, the mandate of the even smaller ECOMICL was transferred in the shortest possible time to MINUOCI/UNOCI (Mission des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire / United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire) to start the hybrid operation with French Licorne forces. Meanwhile in Sierra Leone, the UN, after much waiting in the wings, deployed UNAMSIL with ECOMOG II, alongside UK forces. In general, the larger co-deployed UN missions undertook more ambitious peace implementation programmes than the UN missions during the 1990s in the Mano River Union region, which were of little consequence.

The success of the co-deployment operations in the above instances was largely due to the credibility of the commitment of the lead nation and its ability to establish a strong coalition. A contributory factor was the political will to create conditions for peace in recipient countries that were characterised by weak central governments, or were teetering on the brink of collapse. As a result, the political commitment of Sanni Abacha’s Nigeria and support from the coalition’s soft-power states, including Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Senegal, counterbalanced the perception that Charles Taylor, the major instigator of conflicts in the region, was a strong man because of his support inside and outside the region. This is what contributed to the containment of Taylor’s reign of terror. Under the circumstances, the opinion by some sections of the international community that Nigeria should be cast off had little effect and they were compelled to accept Nigeria’s benign hegemony.

Although the peace platform on which Charles Taylor won the landmark elections in 1997 was questionable and the disarmament processes undertaken by
ECOMOG in Liberia were inconclusive, the sub-regional intervention created an atmosphere conducive to the elections and de-escalated the conflict situation effectively, creating conditions for the deployment of the UN missions. It also served as foundation for change. Consequently, it was possible to oust Taylor from power in August 2003.

**AMIB: South Africa’s co-deployed operation**

In recent times South Africa has exemplified the concept of co-deployment by an African country, starting with its engagement in Burundi where it deployed the South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) in 2001 to provide protection for the returning political leaders. It should be noted that the deployment was necessitated by the fact that Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, which had been requested to assist with the implementation of the Arusha Accord (2000), declined to do so in the absence of a UN Security Council mandate. The UN itself insisted on a comprehensive ceasefire as one of the 11 pre-conditions for the deployment of a UN mission. The SAPSD, which had a maximum strength of about 760 personnel in April 2004, formed part of the South African contingent of about 1 600 and was subsumed by AMIB.
had an authorised strength of about 3 335 before its mandate was transferred to the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in 2005 (Aboagye 2004). With the drawdown of ONUB in December 2006, SAPSDF still maintained an estimated 389-strong VIP-protection security presence in Burundi under bilateral Burundi-South African arrangements and with authorisation by the AU Peace and Security Council (Africa Partnership Forum 2007).

South Africa has also undertaken bilateral and multilateral peace implementation and peacebuilding initiatives in the DRC, alongside the UN Operation in the Congo (MONUC), while in Côte d’Ivoire a detachment of about 40 military personnel supports the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme under a bilateral arrangement with the government of that country.

In view of the fact that the AMIB deployment was not undertaken alongside any other UN or international operation, the operation in Burundi is not a classic example of co-deployment. It did contain aspects of co-deployment, however, notably with regard to the transfer of the peacekeeping mandate to the UN operation.

**Cooperation with the OAU: the OLMEE and UNMEE**

After the Algiers Agreement that ended the disastrous war between Ethiopia and its sister state to the north, Eritrea, that lasted from 1998 to 2000, the OAU mandated the deployment of the OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE), with an authorised strength of 34, but with only 13 military observers to show the AU flag in the mission area. OLMEE’s area of operations included the capitals of both states as well as the temporary security zone.

The deployment was to support the implementation of the Algiers Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities (ACCH, June 2000). This was the key outcome of the framework proximity talks held under the auspices of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, which paved the way for the peace agreement in December of the same year.

However, the UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE), with an authorised strength of 4 200, was principally responsible for keeping the peace between the warring states in the temporary security zone. The UNMEE operation was launched with the deployment of a composite Dutch-Canadian battalion. In practice, the composite battalion was fully integrated with UNMEE, and co-deployed alongside OLMEE. With the exception of minor difficulties in relations between the larger Dutch and the smaller Canadian components, the composite grouping (mixing) of national forces as well as the co-deployment appeared to have worked well, until SHIRBRIG was withdrawn after the initial tour of six months.

In a sense, hybridisation in this context involved the coordination of the operations of the integrated battalion, the UN force and the AU mission.

**External hybrid operations: Licorne, Artemis and Eufor**

Hybridisation of peace operations in Africa is one of the direct consequences of disengagement from direct participation in UN peace operations by the international community. As part of the evolution of multinational operations (US 2007), major Western and developed countries and regional organisations generally seek a UN Security Council mandate for the deployment of national or external regional forces in peacekeeping theatres alongside UN and/or regional forces. However, even when such countries hold key headquarters staff appointments in the mission, they do not fall under the strategic/operational authority, command and control of such UN peace missions. From a Western perspective, the reasons for refusing to submit to such UN authority include competition between and among the UN and regional organisations, concerns about UN command and control, especially in the context of new violent post-Cold War intrastate conflicts, financial issues, political divisions within the Security Council and challenges to the legitimacy of the UN system.

Western countries and organisations have undertaken a number of hybrid operations in Africa that illustrate the remarks made above, notably the following:

- In 2000 the UK deployed a rapid reaction force (Operation Basilica) in Sierra Leone, at the request of the UN, to deal with the aftermath of Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The British forces included a military advisory and training team and the Joint Task Force, which comprised an over-the-horizon rapid reaction force made up of an embarked brigade, and supporting aviation, naval, and air firepower, to deal with the Westside Boys based in the Occra Hills (Riley 2006). Although the UK declined to place its forces under UN command it obtained a Security Council mandate for the operation and held about eight key staff appointments at UNAMSIL headquarters. In conjunction with UNAMSIL, the hybrid operation succeeded in restoring peace to the country.
- In 2003, in nearby Côte d’Ivoire - long held as a bastion of stability in a troubled region - France increased its long-standing garrison from about 3 900 to some 5 600 troops and secured the UN Security Council’s mandate for its force, also known as Licorne, to support peace implementation there. As in the case of Sierra Leone, the French force
operated alongside the UN operation, UNOCI. A particular dimension of hybridisation in Côte d’Ivoire has involved the excessive use of force by Licorne forces in November 2005 and January 2006, including the retaliatory destruction of the Ivorian air force.

- In 2003 when France was hoisting the neo-colonial flag in Côte d’Ivoire, the US Fleet Anti-Terror Support Team (FAST) landed a small force of 150-200 marines in Monrovia, Liberia, where it established a joint task force to provide planning advice and logistical support to ECOMIL (Aboagye & Bah 2005:92-94)\(^5\)

- The deployment of the French-led International Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) codenamed Operation Artemis in 2003\(^6\) was a test case of out-of-area EU intervention in the DRC, at the request of the UN, to stabilise and pacify Bunia and its environs (Faria 2005). It added another dimension to the hybridisation of peace operations by external actors. While the operation did achieve its short-term objective of pacification, it is doubtful that it addressed the long-term security needs in the eastern DRC, which still remains volatile (UN News Centre 2007). In view of its backstopping impact, however, the EU once again deployed Eufor in the DRC in 2006, partly to help the there to stabilise the DRC, but particularly to support the electoral process\(^7\).

**Hybrid operations in perspective**

Without a doubt hybridisation has significant merits, such as obtaining political buy-in, speed of decision-making and simplicity in developing goals and objectives. More significantly, however, is the fact that, if properly employed, hybrid operations provide backstopping capabilities that are also free of the usual limitations of the rules of engagement of UN missions. A further argument is that considerations regarding force protection appear to have influenced the use of hybrid operations, as these make it possible to use a higher degree force not only to accomplish missions, but more fundamentally to ensure the installation and security of such forces.

But hybrid operations also have serious drawbacks. One of them is that selective deployment on the basis of what seems to be neo-colonial interest or national self-interest makes hybridisation unpredictable. The threat that the deployment of such forces pose is the perception that they could be used by the ‘PS’ states to compel countries that are not amenable to big power policy agendas to fall in line with their policies.\(^8\) The fact that hybrid operations allow lead/framework nations and regional organisations to select which operations they are prepared to join also detracts from the capacity of the UN to meet the surge in demand for and quality of peacekeeping resources. This creates unnecessary competition with regional organisations or amongst states within the international community and in addition provides opportunities for regions, states and organisations to pass the blame for inaction or failure to others.

Furthermore, hybrid mandates may on occasion have political ramifications at the regional level, especially in the way that external hybrid forces interpret and apply the applicable rules of engagement. An example of this was the high-handed French destruction of the Ivorian air force in 2004 and 2006 (Amnesty International 2006), which exacerbated problems with the peace implementation and undermined the broad acceptance of hybrid operations in Africa. Given these experiences, NATO’s proposed tactical brigades and air exclusion zones in Darfur and possibly Somalia have also been viewed with a degree of scepticism (Loyt 2005). Thus, in spite of their inherent synergy, hybrid operations suffer from the perception that they have the potential to hinder the implementation of peace because of possible ‘hidden’ national agendas on the part of some external partners.

Two of the most interesting and successful hybrid operations were the joint UN-OAS Haiti mission (MICIVIH), with its dual-hated SRSG, and the ‘unified’ UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), comprising UN, UNHCR, OSCE and EU capabilities under the operational command of a UN SRSG, where strategic authority, command and control of each element were retained by the respective organisations. The most striking aspect of these two missions, and which contributed tremendously firstly to the possibility of such integrated operations and secondly to their success, was the benign political and military nature of those theatres.

In comparison, it is obvious that the current impasse in Darfur extends precisely from non-permissive nature of its environment, which calls into question issues of hybridisation that have hitherto not been important, such as:

- Arrangements for the transfer of mandates, and short-term military support operations and follow-on arrangements
- Unpredictable financing that is a barrier to flexibility of operations
- Gaps in commitments arising from Western agendas of disengagement, abdication and withdrawal
- Difficulties and dilemmas of inter-organisation coordination

---

**Paper 149 • August 2007**
• Donor coordination that could be overwhelming, as well as unpredictable
• Intra-UN coordination, especially in light of the evolution of new multilateral integrated mission structures that duplicate those of UN agencies
• The dilemmas of civilian protection
• Lack of clarity of state-building policy and the enormous challenges inherent in the implementation of such a policy
• Insufficient civilian planning capacity (Jones & Cherif nd)

Contextualising the Darfur conflict: Dilemmas of an AU-UN collaborative approach

The background to the projected hybrid operation in Darfur

Following the collapse of the first ceasefire in Darfur in 2003, the AU was compelled to act more credibly after the establishment of the humanitarian ceasefire in April 2004. In practice, however, the AU intervention in Darfur occurred by default because of the lack of political peacekeeping entry by the UN and the international community. It was also an outcome of the AU’s policy shift from non-interference to non-indifference, as endorsed by the Union’s constitutional right to intervention (AU 2000:7)\(^{19}\) and buttressed by the much espoused policy rhetoric of finding African solutions to African problems. This also found resonance with perceptions within the international community that an African intervention, in the face of President Omar al-Bashir’s stiff opposition to the deployment of ‘foreign forces’ - a term that was understood to include UN forces, but referred specifically to non-AU troops or troops not under AU command and control - was better than no intervention at all. Perhaps more pertinently from a Western perspective, it also obviated any imperative to deploy Western forces in a dangerous theatre in Africa, after it had disengaged precisely as a result of ‘unacceptable’ casualties in the early 1990s in Somalia.

One of the basic problems with the conflict in Darfur is that the warring parties do not agree on the form or purpose of outside intervention. On the one hand, there is the government of Sudan which still has a relatively large military capacity (see figure 2). Its military capacity and superiority are also bolstered by oil wealth, as well as by diplomatic and political support from key states and institutions within the international community, such as China, Russia and the Arab League, whose silence rather strongly reflect their sympathies towards the cause of the Sudanese government.

On the other hand, there are the rebel groups, who are relatively weak with regard to military capacity but who have ambitious political-military objectives. For example, for the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M-W)\(^{20}\) of Abdel Walid Mohammed (Ahmad) al-Nur, a non-signatory of the Darfur peace agreement of May 2006, this embraces ‘the creation of a united democratic Sudan based on equality; the complete restructuring and devolution of power; and the equitable development, cultural and political pluralism and moral and material prosperity for all Sudanese’. However, in its revised manifesto\(^{21}\) SLA/M-W also professed to stand for a ‘New Sudan Order’. This is probably aimed at the self-determination provisions of the comprehensive peace agreement of January 2005 that ended the 20-year war in the south. In general, the rebel and non-military groups have serious objections to the structural inequalities (racial, religious, political and socio-economic) of the country, as well as specific objections to the provisions of the Darfur peace agreement.\(^{22}\)

Clearly, the irreconcilable interests and positions of the conflicting parties in Darfur is a major factor that would have to inform any conflict resolution and management intervention mechanism. In reality, the African intervention in Darfur may have been more effective if it had been based on a credible lead nation, a galvanised coalition and greater consensus among AU leaders for concerted action, including greater capacities on the ground in Darfur, to transform the conflict from the violent to a non-violent phase. It may have been even more effective if the peacekeeping mandate had been transferred to the UN promptly, and further backstopped by external ‘hybrid forces’.

---

**Figure 2 Relative strengths of the warring parties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Army (regular)</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army (conscripts)</td>
<td>20 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air force</td>
<td>3 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>20 000-30 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Defence Force (National Islamic Front)</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>17 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>85 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebels</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)</td>
<td>5 000-10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)</td>
<td>1 000-2 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern Front</td>
<td>3 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the absence of the practicability of recent best practices, the de-escalation of the conflict has also proven extremely difficult, if not impossible. This owes in part to the relative weakness of the rebel groups, which have lost some cohesion, as well as their ineffective proxy strategies and the difficulties relating to the renegotiation of a better deal than the existing agreement which has, for all practical purposes and intent, failed to address the main objectives they seek to realise.

The government is fearful of the possibility of a regime change agenda on the part of the US, which continues to make threatening statements without UN Security Council consensus. Bashir may also fear that the deployment of a pure UN operation will facilitate the arrest of persons indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC), or the possibility that a UN presence will make it easier for investigators to gather evidence that may lead to his own indictment for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Thus the government would welcome divisions within the international community, not only among the P5 countries but also between the UN and the AU, including South Africa which is opposed to the imposition of sanctions. It would certainly prefer that the peacekeeping responsibilities be divided among the AU and the international community to weaken the presence of foreign forces. All this is in addition to the thorny question of command and control modalities for the hybrid operation.

**Framework of the Darfur hybrid project**

Discussions on the hybrid operation in Darfur started in earnest with the agreement in Addis Ababa in November 2006 that the AMIS mandate be transferred to a hybrid UN force. During talks it was agreed that the peace process had to be re-energised, that a ceasefire had to be established and strengthened, and that the way forward for peacekeeping in Darfur had to be found. Fundamentally, the framework under discussion revolved around four key principles:

- The appointment of the special representative of the hybrid mission jointly by the AU and the UN
- The appointment of an African force commander by the AU in consultation with the UN
- Access of the hybrid mission to UN backstopping, and command and control structures and systems
- The determination of the force level by the AU and the UN, based on the consideration of all relevant factors and the situation on the ground, as well as the crucial requirement for the effective accomplishment of the mandate

**Critical parameters of hybrid command and control**

The high-level AU-UN consultations (AU-UN 2007a: 2-4) established parameters that emphasised the following critical issues attendant upon the hybrid operation:

- A decision that force generation will be handled at UN headquarters. This includes determining the allocation of senior command and staff appointments at force and sector levels
- The need for a joint support and coordination mechanism between the AU and the UN. A combined AU-UN task force was proposed in January 2007, in accordance with the existing integrated support services, to facilitate unity of effort. The proposed option revolves around the deployment of additional UN liaison officers and information technology resources, pending a detailed assessment of the actual resources (military, police, logistics, etc)
- The need for clarity on the designation of the mission, including either flying the AU and UN flags, or a specially designed hybrid flag. This will also apply to vehicles/aircraft, headgear and medals
- The development of framework hybrid documents to address the inconsistencies and challenges resulting from the application of the concept on the ground

**Figure 3 Darfur hybrid command and control arrangement**

![Diagram of Darfur hybrid command and control arrangement]

- AU
- UN
- Joint Special Representative
- Force Commander
- Police Commissioner
- Hybrid Military Component
- Hybrid Police Component
Part of the agreement between the AU, UN and the government of Sudan in April 2007 on the implementation of a heavy support package was that the AMIS force commander would exercise operational control over routine UN operations on the ground, while the UN would retain strategic authority, command and control. The UN subsequently (on 29 June 2007) proposed the hybrid command and control structure set out in figure 3 on the previous page, promised to be even more problematic in implementation.

In principle, consensus over the appointment of the leadership of the mission, at least the special representative and the force commander, does not form a crucial part of the denominators of the hybrid command and control, considering that several Africans have already served in such positions. Indeed, in 2000, the Brahimi Panel (UN 2000, paragraph 61) underscored the need for consultations in principle thus:

... better coordination and consultation between potential troop contributors and the members of the Security Council during the mandate formulation process. Troop contributor advice to the Security Council might usefully be institutionalised via the establishment of ad hoc subsidiary organs of the Council, as provided for in Article 29 of the Charter. Member States contributing formed military units to an operation should, as a matter of course, be invited to attend Secretariat briefings of the Security Council pertaining to crises that affect the safety and security of the mission’s personnel or to a change or reinterpretation of a mission’s mandate with respect to the use of force.

However, the tremendous efforts of the AU and UN to secure the agreement of the government over the mission leadership appointments have to be acknowledged. Ambassador Rodolphe Adada, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Congo Brazzaville, is reportedly to be the head of mission, while Lieutenant General Martin Agwai (Nigeria), a former deputy force commander of UNAMSIL, will be the force commander.24

What might have been glossed over in 2000 was the need to build on the UN Security Council’s own 1993 initiative in inviting regional organisations (UN 1999:10-11), within the framework of chapter VIII of the UN Charter, to study ‘ways and means to strengthen their functions to maintain international peace and security within their areas of competence, paying due regard to the characteristics of their respective regions’. Even though the Security Council also called on regional organisations to consider ‘ways and means to further improve coordination of their efforts with those of the United Nations’ (S/25859), the initiative did not receive the necessary policy attention despite the fact that regional organisations, such as ECOWAS, SHIRBRIG and the AU, had at the time all started to contribute in various ways to peacekeeping interventions, and ought to have been involved in such consultations.25

The crucial issues, however, relate to the practical aspects of strategic authority, command and control of the hybrid operation to Darfur. According to the UN definition, these imply the following:

- Provision of legal authority, high-level strategic direction and political guidance by the Security Council
- Responsibility of the Secretary-General for administration and executive direction in operational matters
- The delegated authority of the Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations, for strategic level management, except for security advice, policy and supervision
- The Under-Secretary-General directs and controls the peacekeeping operation, including the formulation of related policies and specific mission guidelines. In this context, it is pertinent to note that whereas the mandating authority normally furnishes the special representative with terms of reference, the hybrid framework for Darfur initially stipulated that the head of the hybrid mission would receive such directives from both organisations, which creates the likelihood of conflict of interests and approaches. It is difficult to see how two terms of reference, one drawn up in New York and one in Addis Ababa, could help even the most astute special representative. It is gratifying that the conventional wisdom in a single harmonised text has eventually prevailed for the effective and smooth leadership of the operation

The first problem is that even though the agreed proposals refer to a one-mission leadership, there has been considerable talk of AU and UN forces with the latter providing backstopping capabilities. This scenario raises fundamental questions regarding authority, command and control. It should be borne in mind that contingents contributed by non-AU countries cannot be placed under AU command, within the framework of the provisions of chapter VII of the UN Charter, unless the entire mission is mandated by the UN Security Council. In that case, however, the scenario equates to a pure UN operation, as the jointly appointed special representative and the force commander will be reporting directly to the mandating authority, the UN Security Council, and not the AU’s Peace and Security Council.

The authority, command and control lacuna in which the UN finds itself will not be helped by the deal
reached in June 2007 in terms of which the UN will retain classic authority, command and control of the operation, while the AU force will take responsibility for routine operations on the ground. As pointed out earlier, it is difficult to imagine how the arrangement will be practically implemented if the UN does provide such operational to strategic control and direction of the mission. The government of Sudan might also have problems with not only the deployment of an expanded UN force, but also the re-division of the area of operational responsibility into the three projected sectors.

Many of these critical issues arise from the lack of clarity on the hybrid operations. While the mission leadership is ‘unified’ - or is presented as such - in contrast with classic hybrid operations involving independent command and control arrangements, the forces on the ground are being perceived as maintaining their independent identity as AU (AMIS), UN (light support package and heavy support package), as well as hybrid AU/UN forces. Thus, even before the challenges with regard to force generation can be addressed, serious questions remain concerning both the backstopping by the UN and how practical such backstopping could be. These fundamental issues need to be separated from the political agenda that surrounds them.

The UN and other stakeholders were probably aware that the proposed hybrid authority, command and control arrangements would cause serious difficulties in implementation because of the politics inherent in each parameter. From a scrutiny of the ground rules already outlined, it is clear that the so-called hybrid operation is a new development that cannot be really classified as a joint operation and certainly not as multinational. The crux of the matter is summed up by Appiah-Mensah’s perception of the situation:

The Darfur hybrid operation is a ground-breaking one … it does not therefore lend itself easily to comparisons and doctrinal analysis … one should not recommend parallels between the Darfur hybrid operation and other co-deployments … rather one should compare co-deployments with the light and heavy support packages, where UN civilian, military and police staff and officers would be under the operational control of UNMIS. In this situation, UN assets and resources are deployed in support of the AMIS operation. In the hybrid operation, we have a UN mission in disguise, because only UN standards, rules and regulations will apply.26

It is therefore not surprising that, in the long run, Security Council resolution 1769 (2007) of 31 July 2007 emphasised that ‘there will be unity of command and control which … means a single chain of command’ (UN 2007a, paragraph 7).

**Force mix**

Another major hurdle concerns the technicalities around the mode of in-theatre deployment, which may involve one or a combination of the following but should also accord with the key elements of the agreement on the establishment of a hybrid operation for Darfur:

- The geographical separation of AU and UN forces in separate sectors, or
- The functional separation of forces in which the African contributions are likely to be in the area of infantry forces, while specialised units for medical, communications, engineering, fixed and rotary air assets, would be provided by international contributors as part of the UN force
- Mixing of AU and UN forces and deploying them for joint operations throughout the mission area.

A fundamental difficulty of this option would be in the determination of the exact and contextual meaning of the mix

Regardless of the actual mix, or segregation, agreed upon, consideration will have to be given to the fact that any ‘segregation’ of forces into separate sectors would not be politically correct and could lead to operational difficulties in sectors where the warring parties choose to make an issue of it for political reasons.

In peacekeeping situations that are less problematic than Darfur, forces have traditionally been deployed in battalions, while company deployments are reserved for such special tasks as headquarters protection and humanitarian escorts or as part of rapid reaction forces and force reserves. These tasks are better able to accommodate a higher degree of mixed groups. Darfur, however, is typical of complex modern missions that would require a chapter VII mandate with robust rules of engagement, and would be equal to scenario 5 of the African Standby Force, involving complex missions with low-level spoilers, and scenario 6 requiring AU intervention in a genocide situation.27 In situations of this nature, it is imperative that brigade size forces be deployed (as the case of the UNMIL, where an Ethiopian brigade was deployed, or MONUC, in which a Pakistani brigade was deployed in the eastern DRC). Deployments of this size facilitate better operational level command and control, as well as the application of rules of engagement and the smooth implementation of standard operating procedures.

**The mandate question**

While a great deal of emphasis has been placed on command and control issues, less attention seems to have been devoted to the hybrid mandate, while it is by no means less critical. On the contrary, the virtual collapse of the 2004 ceasefire agreement, the rejection of the 2006 peace agreement by the warring
movements and Darfurians and the dire humanitarian realities, highlight that what the hybrid operation would be doing is more critical than the issue of who and how the operation would be commanded and controlled. The dilemma raised by the non-permissive scenario in Darfur is that a chapter VII enforcement action is now not a viable option for the UN and the international community:

... the deployment of a UN peace operation may nevertheless be a flawed approach to the fundamental reality of the current situation. Even with Chapter VII authority, for the use of force, a UN peace operation configured to monitor and support a peace process cannot stop widespread violence and fighting between parties who are not committed to a peace process (Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping 2006:2).

The fundamental reason why the existing enhanced AMIS mandate (AU Peace and Security Council 2004, paragraphs 4-7) is not achievable lies in the disparity between the text and the reality, as well as the insufficient means (capabilities) of AMIS (Appiah-Mensah 2005:12-13). The AMIS deployment has been aiming at the ‘restoration of a secure situation throughout Darfur ... underpinned by a political settlement ... allowing a safe environment for the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees’ (AU Peace and Security Council 2004, paragraph 4). However, the specified mandate and mission tasks of AMIS focus more on ‘soft’ security tasks, such as liaison, monitoring, verification and protection. Probably anticipating that ‘mission presence’ would serve as a sufficient deterrent against serious violations of international law, the AMIS mandate was ambivalent about civilian protection, only tasking the mission to be:

- Prepared to protect civilians under imminent threat, in the immediate vicinity and within capabilities
- Prepared to protect static and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within capabilities
- Provide a visible military presence by patrolling and establishing temporary outposts to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population

The reality on the ground is that since its deployment AMIS casualties (AU DITF 2007:6) from blatant hostile action have risen to about 52,4 per cent, while the mission has been unable to take strong action to protect humanitarian agencies and the civilian population. However, AMIS fatalities are comparatively lower than those of the UN globally (Wikipedia 2007).

According to Associated Press (AP WorldStream 2007), the draft UN Security Council resolution ‘demands that all parties in Darfur “immediately cease hostilities and attacks” on the AU force, civilians and humanitarian workers’ and that ‘in the event that the parties ... fail to fulfil their commitments or cooperate fully with this resolution or previous resolutions “the council ... will take further measures”’. Whether the UN Security Council will be able to unshackle itself of the constraints of the great power unanimity, and obtain the requisite votes for such chapter VII measures when this time comes, only time will tell. However, in July 2007 Sudan repudiated the veiled warning from the Security Council, saying that it rejected that part of the resolution that would give the operation the right to use force in Darfur.28

Before the long-awaited UN Security Council resolution was passed on 31 July 2007, the DPKO indicated in its briefings (UN 2007b) that the (military) concept of the proposed hybrid operation will include the following elements:

- Assistance with the establishment of a secure/stable environment, focusing on the implementation of the Darfur peace and subsequent agreements, protection of civilians, ensuring full humanitarian access and facilitation of the return of IDPs and refugees
- Expansion of three core peacekeeping capabilities, namely protection, monitoring and verification, and liaison
- Finding a balance between troop presence and mobility
- As part of this concept, the military briefing outlined six critical military security tasks:
  - Provision of area security, by establishing and patrolling de-militarised zones around IDP camps, buffer zones (obviously between the warring parties), redeployment zones (for the warring parties), protection of civilians, and protection of AU and UN personnel
  - Provision of route security by demilitarising and patrolling humanitarian supply routes, escorting humanitarian aid convoys, and demilitarising nomadic migration routes
  - Monitoring and investigation of violations, which will require that mechanisms for monitoring and verification of the Darfur peace agreement be enhanced
  - Monitoring of armed groups and assisting with the DDR. This will include the verification of disarmament, monitoring and verifying the redeployment of long-range weapons, assisting with the disarmament of former combatants, and establishing and protecting weapon assembly sites and ensuring security of arms collected from former combatants prior to destruction
  - Monitoring and reporting on the security situation along Sudan’s borders with Chad and the Central African Republic
  - Liaison with all parties
With regard to the police, broadly speaking, the focus is on the protection of human rights through support for to the parties in:

- Training in community policing within the IDP camps
- Dealing with public order situations
- Restructuring and building Darfur police capacities
- Protection of civilians from physical violence

The following detailed tasks will form part of the police function:

- To contribute to the protection of civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence and deter attacks against civilians, within its capability and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibility of the government of Sudan
- To monitor through proactive patrolling the policing activities of the parties in the IDP camps, de-militarised zones, buffer zones and areas of control
- To support the establishment and training of community police in the IDP camps, in coordination with the parties as provided for in the Darfur peace agreement
- To support capacity building of the Sudanese government’s police in Darfur, in accordance with international standards of human rights and accountability
- To support the government of Sudan and movement police liaison officers in maintaining public order and building capacity of Sudanese law enforcement through specialised training and joint exercises

The estimated police mandate and tasks appear to be based on assumptions of a permissive environment, with full or reasonable cooperation from the parties, especially the government of Sudan. This implies that the warring parties will cease their persistent violations of the agreements. It should be emphasised again that it will complicate the ability of the police (formed units) to enforce public law and order if it has to be done against a background of sustained armed violence.

While the concept and outline tasks appear to address the intricacies of the Darfur conflict, they do raise a number of serious questions. Those of greatest concern include the following:

- Given the scale of the humanitarian emergency, will the operation realistically be able to guarantee full humanitarian access?
- How practicable and effective will the de-militarised zones around the IDP/refugee camps be, given that the Sudanese police, in the guise of disarmed Janjaweed, will still be present if not in charge of the camps?
- In view of the fluid, overlapping boundaries of the areas under control of the warring parties, how practicable will the establishment of buffer zones be?
- Why is it necessary to demilitarise nomadic migration routes that have existed for decades, if not centuries and millennia, as part of the culture of the people in that area? Is one of the reasons the smuggling of weapons and other items, including the exfiltration (sic) of hijacked AMIS vehicles and equipment? A more worrisome question is whether these routes are likely avenues for the infiltration of al-Qaeda elements to fight the ‘foreign’ forces. In sum, how feasible will it be to accomplish this task without the possibility of a mission-creep and the involvement of the mission in the conflict?
- Finally, given that the DDR is a voluntary one – devolving on the government of Sudan (which is to disarm the Janjaweed) and the parties signatory to the humanitarian ceasefire and Darfur peace agreements – what effective role will the hybrid operation be able to play if the parties continue to show lack of faith in those peace instruments? Will the hybrid operation be able to use force (implied) and be willing to do so, to achieve compliance?

From the above it is clear that there is need for the establishment of a new, robust mandate that facilitates a greater degree of ‘coercive protection’ (Holt & Berkman 2006:5-6, 41-42, 50-53), to address the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur. Until this has been done, it will be futile to address all the critical parameters of the proposed hybrid operation for Darfur. This includes the establishment of a new, comprehensive ceasefire agreement, followed immediately by a comprehensive peace agreement. Only in this way will problems relating to the inclusion or exclusion of those warring parties that were signatory to the humanitarian ceasefire agreement, but not the Darfur peace agreement, be obviated. The Darfur agreements are so problematic that, as in the case of the Liberian conflict where several agreements were required before peace was finally restored, there should be fresh efforts to establish new, respected agreements for the hybrid operation. It is noteworthy that the existing ceasefire agreement was established to replace the first agreement in 2003, which collapsed precisely because the parties failed to respect its provisions.

Security Council Resolution 1769 (2007) of 31 July 2007 by and large included the essential elements of the DPKO proposals. Thus, the council:

... acting under Chapter VII of the United Charter, authorised UNAMID (AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur) ‘to take all necessary action to support implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement ... in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities ... as well as to protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own
personnel and humanitarian workers … prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan’ (UN 2007a, paragraph 15).

In addition to concerns already raised about the mandate question, the key problem with the mandate established by the Security Council relates to the difficulty of supporting and implementing an agreement that has been rejected from its inception.

Slicing up peacekeeping support:
The UN support packages

How critical the Darfur hybrid operation is, is underscored by the imperative to make a difference to the humanitarian plight on the ground in Darfur, through deployed personnel, as well as equipment and logistical support and funding assistance. To meet this need, two categories of support packages have been under discussion, namely a light support package and a heavy support package, with personnel and equipment from the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) or elsewhere.29

The light support package (UN 2007c:2) has an authorised strength of 186 UN personnel (105 military, 33 police and 48 civilians, as of April 2007), to provide advice, support and the following categories of equipment (see figure 5):30

It is clear from this that the package is a token UN gesture, and it a drop in the ocean compared with the comprehensive logistical support that AMIS needs. AMIS is already struggling to fulfil its mandate in extreme conditions, notably the worsening security situation and the extensive area of operational responsibility. In the light of such a logistical nightmare, the heavy support package, which will comprise up to 3 000 UN personnel, will be made up of an estimated 2 250 troops, as well as a police component of 300, supported by three formed police units of unspecified strength, and an unspecified integrated mission (field) support structure (AU-UN 2007b:3-8; UN 2007c:2).

In addition, the area of operational responsibility of AMIS will be demarcated into three sectors in accordance with the heavy support package implementation plan. The restructuring will include the deployment of an additional two battalions, complete with battalion bases and sector headquarters facilities. The US state department has agreed to undertake the construction work. However, the implication of the time required to undertake such construction is that the hybrid operation will only become fully operational in 2008, a time lapse that should cause a certain degree of concern (AU-UN 2007b:6).

Inescapable realities of African force generation

In classic military planning, force generation is a function of several variables, the most important of these being the mandate and mission at hand; the relevant exit strategy; specified and implied tasks of the mission; the security situation resulting from hostilities between the warring parties; and the environment, which is a combination of the physical terrain and mobility, and time and distance considerations. The combination of these factors will also affect the operations, especially deployment and allotment of troops to essential tasks. It is well known that the Darfur environment is a challenging expanse of territory. The briefing on Darfur for troop and police contributing countries (UN 2007b) emphasised that the security challenges concern the unpredictable and volatile security situation, owing to the fragmentation of the parties, proliferation of weapons in IDP camps, deadly attacks on humanitarian agencies/NGOs, the population and AMIS/UN personnel, and armed clashes.

The consideration of these factors, among others, has led the joint AU-UN assessment team to estimate that a total of 17 300 military personnel, 3 300 police experts and 16 formed police units (for executive law enforcement tasks such as crowd control and high risk arrests) apart from an unspecified number of civilians,

Figure 4 UNMIS light support package to AMIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Authorised quantity</th>
<th>Quantity handed over</th>
<th>Outstanding quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Night vision goggles</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sleeping bags</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mosquito nets</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Heavy duty canvas tents</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Assorted size generators</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Comprehensive medical packs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Double ringed cooking sets</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Public information (equipments/kits)</td>
<td>UNMIS/AMIS MoU</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>UNMIS/AMIS MoU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>UNMIS/AMIS MoU</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>UNMIS/AMIS MoU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
will be required (AU DITF nd:1). Subsequently, however, an assessment of critical planning considerations has led the UN, in consultation with the AU and countries that will contribute troops and police, to conclude that in total, the hybrid operation will require about 26 000 personnel. This includes 240 UN military observers and 120 UN liaison officers, and mission support assets. The following charts and tables provide further details (AU-UN 2007b:5-7).

**Figure 5 Concept of the Darfur hybrid operation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept of the Darfur hybrid operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+/- 7 500 – 9 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 5.8 x infantry battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 3 x reconnaissance companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 4 x companies: force/sector reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 2 x logistics units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 3 x transport units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 2 x utility helicopter units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+/- 10 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy support package</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light support package</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 x AMIS infantry battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the one hand, the political will demonstrated by the AU and regional economic communities in mobilising peacekeeping manpower is commendable. However, there has not been much discussion about whether sufficient African military and police manpower exist, or whether Africa has the ability to generate such forces. The fact that the UN has been consistent in emphasising that all forces and police will be generated under UN contracts, standards, rules and
regulations will undoubtedly help to ensure some standardisation in the organisation and equipment of the hybrid operation. It will also help to streamline the administration and management of the mission, including minimum medical health and fitness standards. But these minimum standards do not detract from the challenges involved in the generation of such record-breaking numbers which, ‘after appropriate consultations between the UN and the AU [will], as much as possible, look to preserve the African character of the mission’ (UN 2007b).

Indeed, questions ought to be asked about African capacities at the present time for the contribution of a sufficient number of well trained and equipped personnel. Within the framework of both the humanitarian ceasefire and the Darfur peace agreements the most critical function relates to security tasks, which includes the protection of the force, civilians and humanitarian agencies, as well as disarmament of the Janjaweed. Such demands will undoubtedly place too heavy a burden on African defence and security resources. This applies especially to police organisations of the different countries, which have to enforce law and order, deal with internal security situations, and combat high levels of national and cross-border crime in their own fragile democracies.
Margaret Novicki (2007) has pointed out that at the end of May 2007, there were 9,565 police officers serving in UN peacekeeping and peace-building missions worldwide, which is a 60 per cent increase in the last three years. Of these, some 3,300 officers were from 33 African countries. Together with the AMIS contribution of 1,339 police monitors during the same period, African countries are currently contributing about 5,213 experts to peace missions globally. This is expected to increase with the planned deployment of about 3,300 police experts and 16/19 formed police units, the majority of which may come from Africa, as part of the proposed hybrid operation in Darfur, in addition to the 19,550 military personnel. For both the military and police Africa’s global peacekeeping commitments stood at about 28,725 uniformed personnel as at May 2007, as follows:

- Contributions by 36 African countries to the UN: 19,325 (18.7 per cent)
- Contribution by 29 countries (estimated) to AMIS: 7,700
- Ugandan contribution in Somalia (AMISOM): 1,700 / 1,400

Just on the basis of these bare numbers, it can be argued that generating the required number of military and police manpower, both at the start and on a sustained basis, will pose serious challenges. This level of contribution is only exceeded by that of Asia, where the six leading contributing countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Jordan) alone generate 37,562 personnel, some 45 per cent of the global UN total of 103,293 in 18 peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding missions. Ironically, two of the factors that have contributed to the lack of ‘quality’ resources from the developed world to undertake specific functions in multidimensional peace missions are regionalisation and hybridisation. Novicki has noted an ‘encouraging development and a break with the recent past, namely that two European countries – Italy (2,588) and France (2,074) – have joined the list of top ten contributors. However, it is noteworthy that such Western deployments were mainly in the Middle East, a development that underscores the continued Western disengagement from significant direct participation in peacekeeping in Africa.

According to Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette (2004) there has been a ‘marked shift in the composition of UN peacekeeping forces’ so that contributions from the developing world make up almost two thirds of UN peacekeepers. In fact, troop contributions to peacekeeping has become a third world industry, leading Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the Chief of the DPKO, to comment that ‘the majority of the contributors of blue helmets at present come from the developing countries … they cannot nor should we expect them to continue to shoulder this burden alone … fully recognising that many armies are downsizing and that defence budgets are often dwindling … there is an equally legitimate concern that the credibility and viability of UN peacekeeping remain under threat …’ (Canadian Film Board 2003, chapter VI).

**Conclusion and recommendations**

The peacekeeping intervention in Darfur is in need of more direct, substantive involvement by the UN and the international community, in terms of a new mandate that is not only robust, but addresses the dire humanitarian emergency and the need for effective protection of the vulnerable civilian population. However, the government of Sudan is strongly opposed to the deployment of ‘foreign forces,’ while the rebel forces, both signatory and non-signatories of the Darfur peace agreement, have tried to sink the project. There is thus a need for other mechanisms that allay the concerns of the government, but at the same time effectively leverage the situation from a violent to a non-violent phase, to facilitate humanitarian access and bring about the resolution of the conflict.

The mechanism of a hybrid AU-UN force has highlighted many fundamental issues, which have been discussed extensively. One of the issues is a common definition and application of the concept of the mechanism of hybrid operations. However, the most serious issue revolves around authority: first, which organisation, the AU or the UN, should exercise command and control over the force and the operation; second, how such authority should be exercised; and finally what the relationship (modal and functional) between the UN and AU forces should be. Contextually, the key issue hinges on the fundamental principle of unity of command at both the operational and strategic, and even tactical, levels between the AU and the UN and their forces on the ground.

In view of the fact that a classic one-mission proposal still does not seem to be a fully acceptable option to the Sudanese government, the most acceptable alternative for the present is a hybrid AU-UN operation. However, in its application the concept should not deviate from the principle of equal partnerships aimed at a common end state. This should include the stabilisation of the political, security and humanitarian situation (Sudan Tribune 2007), with the need to coordinate operations as the point of departure. From a technical point of view, the concept demands independence of command and control, as well as of force identity. The challenge in the hybrid operation for Darfur is that in order to overcome the opposition of the government of Sudan some means have to be found to artificially integrate AU-UN forces. These can then be deployed throughout the area of operational responsibility in common designated sectors, with each possibly undertaking functionally different missions and tasks.
It would appear that the option of co-deployment which worked well before is not an acceptable alternative at this time. It will have to be one of the issues that is revisited in the international community’s search for a harmonisation of peacekeeping. Meanwhile, it is worrisome that for the sake of political expediency, the AU and the UN seem bent on experimenting with a complex form of hybrid operation that is liable to be exploited by the major protagonists in Darfur. To avoid failure, the AU, UN and the international community need to arrive at greater multilateral consensus, among others, to reinvigorate the Darfur peace process. As this is the crucial aspect that underpins the success of the hybrid experiment, with its aim of civilian protection in the worsening conflict. Resolution 1769 (2007) of the Security Council, which had to compromise on the threatened economic sanctions, attests to this by ‘emphasising that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Darfur’ and ‘welcomes the commitment expressed by the government of Sudan and some parties … to enter into talks … in line with the deadlines set out in the roadmap …’ (UN 2007a, paragraph 18). In this regard, the achievement of a common, realistic rebel position will enhance the chances of reaching a comprehensive agreement at the next round of negotiations. This will compel the government of Sudan to approach the talks with the seriousness that it deserves the sake of a durable peace in the troubled region of Darfur.

At the operational level, it is essential to pay attention to the following aspects that may help to contain the challenges and pitfalls of the proposed operation:

- Given that the UN presence is conditional, in spite of the fact that it is the major partner, it should deploy fewer forces than the AU and to deploy specialised capabilities that may not exist in the AU force
- On the assumption that the intention to deploy a fully integrated hybrid force will entail considerable command and control snafus, consideration should be given to establishing the UN force in brigade formation sectors - along with formed police unit elements - with a robust mandate that will facilitate the envisaged backstopping role
- The ‘predominant’ AU force may maintain its eight-sector deployment, but could include other specialised capabilities. This will make it possible for each battalion to respond immediately to violations of the peace instruments within its sector and battalions within range could also offer mutual support to each other. If the African forces are deployed in brigade strength, each brigade could preferentially be not made up of multinational personnel as this could cause difficulties in interoperability
- On a very fundamental level, the AU, with political and diplomatic support from the UN and the international community, and especially the Arab League, should seek a revision of the mandate of AMIS, to provide the requisite legal framework for effective civilian protection
- The civilian protection mandate should preferably be spelled out in unambiguous terms. However, there is the likelihood that such a mission statement may not pass within the UN Security Council or the AU Peace and Security Council. Therefore, the protection mandate could be implied in the mission statement (Durch et al 2003:23-25) and be spelled out in greater detail in the directives to the mission leadership
- To ensure unimpeded implementation of the hybrid mandate, planning for a worst-case scenario should include the possibility of backstopping the hybrid operation with capabilities from the projected EU framework force in eastern Chad and the northern Central African Republic (Aboagye 2007)
- Two types of support should be provided. Continuous funding from external partners to support the AU force, and operational support from the UN force. The practical details of both and particularly how the UN support will extend throughout the operation to the AU force, should be more clearly defined
- Given the nature of the variables, hybrid operations will obviously work better if there is maximum integration at planning and decision making levels and such decisions are implemented in support of the separate hybrid forces. To the extent possible, therefore, joint multinational forces, or better integrated headquarters, should make provision for truly practicable integrated planning and execution through structures such as joint information (intelligence) and operations centres. There should also be integrated centres for functions such as fire support coordination and joint logistics
- Whatever happens, the AU and the UN should not allow the dual nature of the proposed Darfur hybrid operation to affect the morale of the different forces, as occurred in the case of the expanded ECOMOG

The experiences that have been attendant to the hybrid operation in Darfur should serve as a platform for continued debate on the evolution of peacekeeping doctrine generally and hybrid operations specifically. In the meantime, care should be taken not to increase political-military nuanced concepts, doctrines and mechanisms, especially on the basis of national doctrines or those of some regional security organisations.

Lastly, the experiences gained with regard to the proposed hybrid AU-UN operation in Darfur should inform the need for a review of the implementation of the Brahimi Panel’s recommendation on consultations between the UN and countries that contribute troops and police resources. This should be extended to regional organisations that should participate in
integrated mission planning process. As cautioned by the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in 1998 (UN 1999:12), too much emphasis on the regionalisation and hybridisation of peace operations will be a recipe for further intervention debacles.

Notes

1 Described as fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives (online). Available at http://www.answers.com/topic/doctrine [accessed 14 June 2007].

2 The OAU was established in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 25 May 1963. The main objectives of the OAU were to rid the continent of the remaining vestiges of colonisation and apartheid; to promote unity and solidarity among African states; to coordinate and intensify cooperation for development; to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states; and to promote international cooperation within the framework of the UN. In the area of peace and security, it relied mainly on the principle of pacific settlement of disputes, based on the principles of equal sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of member states.

3 In his comments on the proposed definitions, Seth Appiah-Mensah has for instance pointed out that, broadly speaking, the political missions undertaken by the Department of Political Affairs of the UN, such as BONUCA (CAR) and currently in Nepal, could also be ‘hybridised’ if the respective regional organisations gain buy-in on co-ownership, even though no forces would be involved.

4 This entails exchanges of information, negotiation, resolution of conflicts, mutual support, and planning at all levels between military elements (including civilian police) and humanitarian and development organisations or the local civilian population, to achieve objectives.

5 For further background information and analysis, see Berman and Sams (2000).

6 At a much earlier date, it was perhaps only in Timor Leste (formerly East Timor) that Australia led a regional coalition (the International Force in East Timor) to intervene in September 1999, before transferring the mandate to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor in October 1999.

7 SHIRBRIG became fully operational in 1996 after being launched in 1994 as an initiative to reinforce the UN standby arrangements system, within the framework of the 1992 agenda for peace.

8 The Arusha peace accord on the Burundi conflict was signed on 28 August 2000.

9 The UN had even suggested that the security of returning political leaders should be contracted to private security companies, reflecting a trend within the international community towards the partial privatisation of peacekeeping.

10 The initial strength of SAPSD was about 150. The other contributors to AMIB were Ethiopia (685) and Mozambique (224). Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia together contributed 43 military observers.

11 For a more detailed background of these operations, see Aboagye (2004).

12 These deployments were in addition to the co-deployment of AU and UN observers, as well as those from the parties involved, along the DRC-Rwanda border as part of the verification mechanism of September 2004.

13 As part of a trilateral agreement involving the DRC and Belgium, a South African detachment of about 35 military personnel supports the training and integration of forces within the DRC. It also supports the ‘brassage’ programme involving the construction and management of two demobilisation sites, as part of a 5 million project funded by the Netherlands.

14 As a result of amongst others the stalemate over the demarcation of the border in accordance with the 2002 ruling by the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission, as well as a shift in the focus towards the more volatile conflict in Darfur, support for the OLMEE has declined and resulted in a reduction in the size of the military (observer) component to nine.

15 Italy’s interest in and engagement with peace implementation in Somalia is another good example of hybridisation.

16 UNSC Resolution 1484 (2003) of 30 May 2003 authorised the EU’s interim emergency multinational force in Bunia until 1 September 2003. With France as its framework nation, a concept adopted by the EU in July 2002 for the conduct of autonomous EU-led crisis management operations, the exit strategy of Artemis devolved to the deployment of a UN rapid reaction brigade.

17 By means of UNSC Resolution 1671 of 25 April 2006, EUFOR was in addition mandated to protect ‘civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the government of DRC’. It was also expected to contribute to protection of the airport in Kinshasa and extract individuals in danger from the country.

18 It was used in this way by the US, who was unwilling to join calls for a Security Council response to the crises the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire, arguably as retribution for France’s opposition to its invasion of Iraq in 2003.

19 Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU provides for the right of the Union to intervene in a member state in grave circumstances, including war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. It is interesting that article 4(j) provides for the right of a member state to request intervention from the Union to restore peace and security.

20 In addition to the SLA/M-W, the rebel groups include the SLA/M/M of Minni Arko Minawi (a signatory party to the DPA); the Justice and Equality Movement of Khalil Ibrahim which is supported by Chad; and the National Movement for Reform and Development, a JEM splinter group in 2004. There are also several other non-militant groups.

21 Taken from their manifesto, entitled Sudan liberation movement and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLM/A) political declaration, Amended and revised in Kampala ‘Uganda’, Friday, 4 May 2007. The author received a

The objection concerns the power-sharing arrangements under which it is demanding the post of vice presidency. Other objections concern dissatisfaction with the lack of detail on the verifiable disarmament of the Janjaweed and the restrictions on the movement of the Popular Defense Force and their downsizing. They also made demands for compensation for victims of the war and on justice for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Other consultations included the endorsement by the AU Summit of the PSC (30 November 2006), the statement by the President of the Security Council (19 December 2006), the Riyadh Agreement (28 March 2007), the high level agreement on the heavy support package for AMIS (9 April 2007) and the latest agreement reached in Addis Ababa on 12 June 2007.

Reportedly Major-General Henry K Anyidoho of Ghana, a former deputy force commander of the fated UN assistance mission for Rwanda from 1993 to 1996, will be the deputy head of mission.

In unpublished policy memos at the AU, the author, who was then a senior military expert for the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict at the Secretariat, had argued for such a consultation. It could have been arranged, because the UN subsequently undertook ad hoc visits to African hot spots, such as the visit in February 2002 to address the peace process between the two countries and to discuss the further implementation of the Algiers agreement (2000). This occurred before the announcement of the decision of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission, as well as the session in Nairobi in October 2004, to lend support to the peace process in Sudan (United Nations Radio 2004).

This comment was made on 1 July 2007 on an earlier draft of the paper.

The ASF scenarios are: (1) AU/regional military advice to a political mission; (2) AU/regional co-deployed observer mission; (3) AU/regional stand-alone observer mission; (4) AU/regional chapter VI peacekeeping force and preventive deployment missions; (5) AU complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission with low-level spoilers, an enduring feature of many current conflicts; and (6) AU intervention, such as in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly.

The author received a copy of the article by O McDoom entitled Sudan rejects use of force by UN-AU mission, of 22 July 2007, from Martin Plaut of the BBC.

In UN Security Council Resolution 1590 (2004) of 24 March the UN established the UNMIS, commended the AU and encouraged the international community to provide support to the AU. In it the Secretary-General also mentioned the possibility that UNMIS should reinforce the effort to foster peace in Darfur through appropriate assistance, including logistical support and technical assistance, to AMIS. It should also identify liaison possibilities with the AU to utilise UNMIS’s resources, particularly logistical and operations support elements, as well as reserve capacity towards that end.

UNMIS, Coordination Office for the United Nations Mission in Sudan, UN Support to AMIS, Update on UN Support to AMIS, 30 April 2007.

See also piece by I Melander (2007) entitled EU takes first step for Chad Darfur refugee force [online], Brussels, 23 July. Reuters. Copy was received online from M Plaut of the BBC.

Bibliography


AU DITF (Darfur Integrated Task Force) nd. Report of discussions by the DITF on the proposed hybrid. Addis Ababa.


Durch, W J, Holt, V K, Earle, C and Shanahan, M K 2003. The...


Subscription to ISS Papers

If you would like to subscribe to ISS Paper series, please complete the form below and return it to the ISS with a cheque, or a postal/money order for the correct amount, made payable to the Institute for Security Studies (marked not transferable).

Please note that credit card payments are also welcome. You can also deposit your payment into the following bank account, quoting the invoice number and the following reference: PUBSPAY.

ISS bank details: ABSA, Brooklyn Court, Branch Code: 634156, Account number: 405 749 8921

Please mail or fax:
ISS Publication Subscriptions, PO Box 1787, Brooklyn Square, 0075, Pretoria, South Africa.
ISS contact details: (Tel) +27 12 346 9500, (Fax) +27 12 460 0998, Email: pubs@issafrica.org
Website: www.issafrica.org

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Surname</th>
<th>Initials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Postal address</th>
<th>Postal Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tel</th>
<th>Fax</th>
<th>E-mail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ISS PAPERS SUBSCRIPTION 2007 – MIN 8 PER YEAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>African countries*</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R 150.00</td>
<td>US$ 30.00</td>
<td>US$ 40.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Comores, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Reunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe (formerly African Postal Union countries)

Details of subscription rates for the African Security Review, ISS Monographs, SA Crime Quarterly or other ISS publications are available from:

ISS Publication Subscriptions, P O Box 1787, Brooklyn Square, 0075, Pretoria, South Africa
Tel: +27-12-346-9500/2  •  Fax: +27-12-460-0998  •  Email: pubs@issafrica.org  •  www.issafrica.org
The ISS mission

The vision of the Institute for Security Studies is one of a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by a respect for human rights, the rule of law, democracy and collaborative security. As an applied policy research institute with a mission to conceptualise, inform and enhance the security debate in Africa, the Institute supports this vision statement by undertaking independent applied research and analysis; facilitating and supporting policy formulation; raising the awareness of decision makers and the public; monitoring trends and policy implementation; collecting, interpreting and disseminating information; networking on national, regional and international levels; and capacity building.

About this paper

The paper presents a critical review of the concept of the mechanism of hybrid operations, as one of the emergent post-Cold War peacekeeping trends. While the experiential and diagnostic features of hybrid operations have previously appeared in some theatres, the dynamics of its use by the AU and the international community in the conflict in Darfur have raised considerable difficulties. The argument in this paper is that the proposed hybrid AU-UN operation in Darfur is a political construct that makes its practical application in Darfur extremely difficult. It does not prescribe solutions to the critical issues. However, it concludes that the right lessons should be learned from the experiences with the Darfur hybrid operation, for future operations.

About the author

FESTUS B ABOAGYE is the head of the Training for Peace Programme at the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, and currently serves as the secretary of the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA). He was an official of the OAU and AU from 2000 to 2004 and has previous professional military service experience with the Ghana Armed Forces (1973-2003) during which he attained the rank of colonel. He has written two books on the Ghana Army and ECOMOG and is the co-editor of A tortuous road to peace: The dynamics of regional, UN and international humanitarian interventions in Liberia, which was published by the ISS in 2005.

Funders

The publication of this paper was made possible by generous funding from the Royal Norwegian Government, through the Training for Peace Programme, and the French Embassy in Pretoria.